Internal chaos, outdated tactics plague Russian military efforts

Tactics from the Soviet Union era, "human wave attacks," and equipment reminiscent of the late 20th century. The weakness of Russian armored units is visible to the naked eye, so where do Putin's army's advances come from? And how long can Russia continue to tap into its mobilization reserves when it loses an average of 30-40% of its forces in each skirmish?

Russian armored-mechanized units have struggled with maneuver warfare since the beginning of the war. Commanders committed rookie mistakes, logistics failed to provide support, and soldiers left to their devices lost their composure. This was particularly evident during the battles near Brovary, Kharkiv, and the Ukrainian counteroffensive near Hostomel.

Then, it only got worse, and fierce battles near Vuhledar showed that the pride of the Russian army was in decay. Where do the high losses of Russian armored-mechanized troops come from? The problem is complex and rooted in Soviet times.

The lost war in Georgia showed that the rigid military structure derived from the Soviet era is outdated and does not meet the changed conditions of a modern battlefield. A few months after the end of operations in 2008, the Kremlin initiated a reform intended to increase unit mobility, facilitate command, and reduce staff without losing combat capability.

By 2013, the peacetime organization of armored forces, which still originated from Soviet times, was changed. The highest rank was the army, followed by the division, regiment, and the battalion. After the changes, the division was removed from the organization as a logistical support element, and brigades were made responsible for logistics. This was intended to increase mobility by assigning logistic units directly to tactical battalion groups, similar to how NATO forces have operated for years.

The organizational change was noticeable during the first months of the war in Ukraine, but in the Russian version, it ultimately failed. Observing the logistical operation, the chaos among the Russians was evident. Mechanized columns stuck to main, wide roads because the logistical convoys accompanying them didn't allow for other actions.

As soon as the columns veered onto narrow or unpaved roads, they got stuck in the mud or tight streets and were quickly eliminated. Consequently, as seen in online videos, columns with tankers passing through residential areas had to wait patiently because they couldn't leave fuel tankers or ammunition trucks unprotected and expect them to reach their destination.

The reform would have made sense without the disarray and Russian sloppiness. The Americans showed how it was done in 1991 during Operation Desert Storm and again in 2003 during the capture of Baghdad. Airborne units took bridges, and fast mechanized forces with strong direct air support broke through Iraqi army defense lines and marched into the city center.

The American attack was orderly: first, parachutists secured key positions, then reconnaissance teams fanned out looking for the best routes, followed by combat groups under infantry cover. Artillery was in the third line, and at the very end, logisticians organized forward staging points for on-hand supplies. The Americans did not pause for any shortages, utterly unlike the Russians.

The Americans developed the tactics from the Arabian Peninsula since World War II, giving them time to perfect the details and drill the doctrine into even the rank-and-file soldiers. The Russians had much less time and, above all, did not reform their training system.

Another structural mistake by the Russians was not adapting the training system for conscripts and contract soldiers to the needs of an actual military operation. Soldiers were trained to perform tasks on training grounds in comfortable exercise conditions. No one interfered with the deployment. Artillery fired from prepared positions with the support of drones, and air forces flew freely over the battlefield. This training process looked excellent for official demonstrations but utterly failed in actual combat.

Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, company and battalion commanders have struggled with field command. They committed tactical errors: moving in tight columns, lacking air defense, and neglecting reconnaissance. To make matters worse, group commanders couldn't cooperate with artillery and air forces. It quickly became apparent that the ground forces were practically without close air support.

A prime example of such an operation was the battle near Brovary, where a regiment was directly led by its commander in the first tank. When his tank was destroyed, the column stopped in the middle of the city, and Ukrainian artillery thoroughly destroyed it. Logistics failed. Morale collapsed. Desertions began, and abandoned equipment littered the fields. Had it not been for that, the Russian armored regiment would have entered Kyiv from the east.

As time went on, the situation for the Russians worsened. Soldiers who gained some experience were either eliminated from further fighting or had to take a break. Currently, the army is commanded by people without education and experience, burdened by political demands, making it impossible to act according to military practice.

This was evident near Vuhledar and Kurakhove, where the Russians reverted to tactics the Soviets developed a hundred years ago. This strategy involves artillery preparation followed by a tank and infantry assault. This strategy only works due to the Russians' high numerical advantage, which allows them to afford significant losses. Near Kurakhove, they lost about 60% of the forces used in the attack, also due to the commanders’ lack of understanding of the tactical situation.

The biggest problem for Russians directly on the battlefield is the lack of reconnaissance assets at the tactical level. Their drones, such as the Orlan-10, are technologically very low-level. Additionally, Ukrainians destroy them so effectively that domestic defense factories cannot keep up with replacing losses. Hence, the purchases from Iran, scouting other markets, and use of makeshift solutions.

Combat units often have no idea what lies just two miles ahead. They don't know whether the vehicles in front are friendly or Ukrainian, where to strike to hit a gap in the defense, or how to direct artillery fire effectively.

Another issue for the Russians is that both sides are still using equipment from the Soviet era. Without identification friend-or-foe systems in ground forces and the lack of light reconnaissance tools, including drones, the Russians are forced to paint large letter markings on vehicle hulls to avoid mistaking their vehicles for enemy ones in the chaos of battle.

The Russian army is poorly trained and even more poorly commanded. Line commanders are evidently lost, and Moscow staff pressures them to complete assigned tasks. For several years, officers who were primarily loyal to the regime were promoted rather than those who distinguished themselves. Hence, the recurring "human wave attacks."

Those sent to execute them are soldiers who have been in the reserve for years and underwent only cursory refresher training before being sent to the front. Moreover, they are equipped with gear mostly pulled from forgotten warehouses, so their Fire Control Systems, communication systems, and armament are, at best, from the late 20th century.

This means that Russian losses will grow, and their minimal successes on the front will be paid for with more graves. Russians can only continue operations as long as they can dig into their mobilization reserves. And these are not bottomless.