Black sea fleet struggles: Russia's naval setbacks exposed

The Russians are using ships against Ukraine that are not meant for large-scale warfare. Today they themselves noticed that the Black Sea Fleet lost to the Ukrainian navy, which, does not have ships at all. "Where is the fleet? It's gone. This is really a victory of the enemy," the politician thunders.

Every year, on the last Sunday of July, Russia celebrates Navy Day with warship parades, concerts, and fireworks displays. The celebrations in St. Petersburg are usually organized with great pomp, and the city does not sleep for the entire week. However, this year the celebrations were held in a scaled-down form.

They canceled part of the parade in Kronstadt, limiting it to ceremonies on the Neva River for the first time in eight years. The whole event lasted one day. Everything was canceled in Novorossiysk on the Black Sea, and small parades were held only in Baltijsk, Vladivostok, and Severomorsk, far from Ukrainian missiles.

Ukrainian intelligence noticed that the Russians had almost entirely stopped sending surface ships equipped with Kalibr missile systems to sea, continuing their offensive against Ukrainian cities primarily with submarines.

"Russia is present in the Black Sea only at the expense of submarines. This can be considered a new [strategy] of the commander, who was appointed a few months ago. Accordingly, they cannot afford to be in the waters of the Black Sea,," said Cmdr. Dmytro Pletenchuk, press officer of the Ukrainian Navy.

The Russian Navy has not had much to boast about in recent months, making its holiday the saddest in years. This results from years of neglect and underfunding. Ships were sent into battle that were not fully prepared for such an intense war conflict.

The core of the Black Sea Fleet consists of Project 11356R Burevestnik-class frigates. These ships are based on the "budget" frigate for the Indian navy, the Talwar-class. This design mainly relies on technologies and weapons systems from the 1990s, which, according to plans of the Navy of the Russian Federation, were supposed to speed up the construction and commissioning of the ships.

Compared to their Indian counterparts, the ships built for Russia have limited self-defense abilities against aircraft and submarines. The vertical launch system 3S14, installed on Burevestnik-class ships serving in the Black Sea Fleet, has limited capabilities and can only carry missiles from the 3M14 Kalibr family. This now causes problems for the Russians.

The Kalibrs had issues overcoming Ukrainian air defense, so they started considering using 3M55 Oniks missiles against land targets. These can only be carried by the small corvettes of Project 21631 Buyan-M class. Only at the end of 2023 did the Russians begin developing universal launchers for all types of ships.

These ships, in turn, have insufficient seaworthiness, making their use almost impossible in winds stronger than 20 mph Beaufort scale. Furthermore, they do not possess self-defense capabilities against maritime drones and aerial threats. Patrol ships of Project 22160 Vasily Bykov class have similar problems. Both types have limited self-defense systems, including the 9K38 Igla surface-to-air systems, six-barreled 30 mm AK-630M cannons, and heavy machine guns.

The Russians solved the air defense problem by installing the Tor-M2KM anti-aircraft system on the helicopter landing site. These were supposed to be installed on all four Black Sea corvettes of the Vasily Bykov class. However, it was noted that the installation process would depend on the experience of operating the anti-aircraft system in combat conditions. Before that happened, one of the four ships was sunk, and two were damaged.

After two years of war, the Russians admitted that their ships were suitable only for representing the flag, not for conducting intense military operations. Each type has a flaw that disqualifies it from being used in a full-scale conflict. Deputy Chairman of the State Duma, Yevgeny Fedorov, was more blunt.

The politician stated that the Black Sea Fleet, though physically existing, has been effectively destroyed.

"There is no Russian Navy as an operational mechanism in the Black Sea! Neither physically nor in terms of its real combat presence," said Fedorov.

"Where is the fleet? It's gone. This is really a victory of the enemy. It's a fact. That fact of the enemy's victory. And the fact that the ships are still there somewhere, somewhere in Sevastopol or Novorossiysk, well, perhaps they are. But they do not exist in terms of a strategic combat unit. That is, they do not control the Black Sea," thundered the Russian politician.

The Ukrainians drove the Black Sea Fleet far from the operational area and the main base in Sevastopol. The Russians took refuge in Novorossiysk, which was not adapted to accommodate many ships. Therefore, all auxiliary units remained in Crimea, and smaller ships were transferred to the Caspian Sea.

Pletenchuk, press officer of the Ukrainian Navy, explains that there is practically no more space in the port of Novorossiysk. The Russians have problems with mooring places. Without such problems, they would have transferred more units from Crimea. But they don't do it because besides placing them there, they also need to maneuver, and this naval base is not designed for the number of units there.

For this reason, the Kremlin accelerated investment in the naval base in Ochamchire in Abkhazia, which the Russians captured during the war with Georgia. The largest ships of the Black Sea Fleet—frigates, submarines, and large corvettes—are ultimately supposed to be stationed there. Until now, only a detachment of the Federal Security Service's Coast Guard was stationed in Ochamchire. This way, the Russians admit they cannot defend their main bases in Sevastopol and Novorossiysk.

A major problem for the Russians is not only the lack of appropriate ships equipped to meet the demands of the battlefield but, above all, the trained crews. The Navy is a armed forces branch that requires well-trained soldiers with technical knowledge. The Russians do not have them because conscripts go to the fleet by assignment, and the best remain as contract sailors. However, the training level still leaves much to be desired.

This is a global problem for the Russian army. Soldiers are trained according to a scheme, not according to needs. Therefore, Russian sailors are not able to hit the target despite having the most modern fire control systems on board, which the Russian fleet also possesses.

Another problem is the lack of infrastructure. The shipyard in Sevastopol is regularly attacked. The Russians have already lost two ships on slipways. In Novorossiysk and Ochamchire, there are practically port workshops, not a shipyard. Therefore, ships are leaving for the sea less and less often. After two years of continuous voyages, all units should undergo thorough inspections and repairs.

The Russians lost the war at sea due to their own doing. The scale of mistakes is staggering, as is the lack of reflection from the command. Just before Navy Day, exercises were conducted during which neither fights with maritime drones nor the protection of base areas were practiced in any way. That is exactly the aspect the Russians have been losing for two years.