Ukrainians seize 440 square miles, Russia scrambles for defense

Ukrainians have occupied significant swaths of Russia at an extraordinary pace. The Russians are defending themselves rather sluggishly, bringing in regiments from training grounds, units held in reserve for strike groups, and even ad-hoc companies formed from airport personnel to face the attack. Do the Russians lack troops to defend the oblast?

The Kremlin is still scratching its head, wondering how the Ukrainians managed to occupy approximately 440 square miles of Russian territory within a week. In comparison, Russian fighters in Donbas barely took two square miles during the same period. Despite several days of operations, they have not been able to stop the Ukrainians or even bring in the appropriate reinforcements to bolster the Chechen units, the Federal Security Service Border Protection Service, and the National Guard fighting units.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainians have leveraged all their strengths and exploited their opponent's weaknesses. Firstly, they maintained the entire operation under strict secrecy, hiding the movement of six brigades, including five heavy ones, right to the Russian border from Russian imagery reconnaissance. This ensured the element of surprise.

The next step was to cut off the defenders from their support base. Thanks to advanced radio-electronic warfare systems and excellent imagery reconnaissance, they superbly isolated the battlefield in every possible way. The former allowed them to almost completely isolate the battlefield and neutralize the opponent's drones. The latter provided the ability to anticipate Russian moves and strike mechanized columns before they reached the front. Ukrainians have already destroyed self-propelled howitzers and tanks twice while they were still on transport trailers.

In addition, Ukrainian soldiers strictly monitored social media posts. Based on the published photos and videos, it was impossible to locate where they were. It was different for the Russians. Experience from the first year of the war taught them nothing. Near Kursk, a journalist live-broadcasted the march of a transport column carrying Msta-S self-propelled howitzers. Shortly after, Ukrainians located it using reconnaissance drones and destroyed it with HIMARS systems.

The Ukrainians excel when exploiting operational depth, as demonstrated during defensive battles in 2022. In the attack, they utilized the experience and knowledge gained during cooperation and training at NATO grounds. The 22nd Independent Mechanized Brigade, spearheading the attack, was equipped with Polish PT-91 tanks and BWP-1 armored personnel carriers, trained at Polish training grounds.

The Ukrainians executed the operation according to Western standards. First, they neutralized Russian reconnaissance and isolated the battlefield. Then, special units moved in, followed by rapid battalion combat groups from mechanized brigades. They managed to leverage their strengths and exploit the weaknesses of the Russian army.

Since the beginning of the war, the Russians have proven to be extremely poorly trained in maneuver warfare. Just as they lost at Chernihiv, Brovary, and Kharkiv, they failed at Kursk. This is due to the weakness of their training system, which prefers routine. Soldiers are trained to move from point A to B, open fire, and drive out the opponent. Training scenarios do not anticipate any problems. Therefore, Russian commanders have trouble adapting when something deviates from the assumed plans. This applies not only to field commanders but also to staff officers.

The Russians in the Kursk oblast had no maneuver reserves to transfer to the threatened area quickly. All trained and equipped forces were either on the front lines or in the rear for combat readiness restoration. The command did not expect a Ukrainian strike and underestimated Ukrainian capabilities. Additionally, they were completely caught off guard.

Only on the third day of the operation did they start bringing in individual companies, such as the 810th Independent Guard Naval Infantry Brigade and the 155th Independent Guard Naval Infantry Brigade from the Volchansk area, which was resting after fighting for Volchansk. Four battalions from the operational reserve of the Northern Military Group were also brought in from the Kharkiv direction, originally intended for an assault on Kharkiv province.

Other units began to be called in directly from training grounds where they were undergoing training. Three reinforced mechanized rifle battalions from training regiments, primarily composed of conscripts, were sent to the breach from the Kursk bases.

Units withdrawn to the General Staff's strategic reserve after suffering losses in Donbas had to interrupt their reorganization. This includes the 15th Tank Regiment from the 69th Mechanized Division, two battalions from the 7th Air Assault Division, the 38th Mechanized Rifle Brigade, and the 64th Mechanized Rifle Brigade.

Russian actions are marked by chaos and a lack of planning. The localized Ukrainian assault forced the Russians even to bring in training units. The Ukrainians exploited that the Russians had concentrated almost all their forces in Donbas, where they were advancing very slowly and lacked units to protect the borders. Announcements published by local authorities evidence the scale of the problem.

Kremlin propaganda insists that the Ukrainians are suffering heavy losses and that the "invincible army" is driving them out. However, the regional authorities' communication channels tell a different story, calling for forming militia units akin to the German Volkssturm. Even the rhetoric used by the Russians is similar to that of Joseph Goebbels, who spoke of the "final goal of exterminating the German people."

The Russians talk about driving out fascists and defending Russian values against the rotten West. One such unit is led by special forces veteran Sergey Evdokimov, known for posting propaganda statements on social media. Now, he encourages "healthy, patriotic Russian men" to join volunteer units.

Such spontaneous units are forming due to personnel shortages in services. Police officers, training recruits, and even aviation technicians are starting to be sent to the front. The defense of the Kursk oblast is extremely chaotic, and even rear units – logisticians, cooks, and clerks – are slowly being sent to the front lines. Russia increasingly appears to be a poorly managed empire on clay feet.