Truth behind the red button: Nuclear control unearthed
"I too have a Nuclear Button, but it is a much bigger & more powerful one than his," stated then-President of the United States Donald Trump in 2018. He was responding to threats from North Korea's leader, who was intimidating the U.S. with a potential nuclear attack. In reality, a nuclear red button does not exist, although it often serves as a metaphor for initiating a nuclear exchange. Like many myths, this one contains a grain of truth.
1:02 PM EST, November 5, 2024
The notion of a red button that, when pressed by a leader of a nuclear power, triggers a global nuclear conflict is a popular myth in pop culture. The vision of the world's destruction initiated by a button captures the imagination, but—in the case of the United States—it is entirely untrue.
Desk with a red button
American presidents work at a unique piece of furniture: the Resolute desk, crafted from the wood of a ship by the same name. On an Arctic rescue mission in the mid-19th century, the British vessel became stranded in ice. Years later, an American whaler found it, and the ship was towed to port, repaired at the United States' expense, and returned to Great Britain.
See also: Is this NATO equipment or Russian?
When the Resolute ended its service, Queen Victoria had four desks made from its wood. She gifted one to President Rutherford Hayes.
This very desk remains in the White House, situated in the Oval Office. Over the years, a small wooden box with a red button has sat on its surface.
During Trump's presidency, this button was used to order Diet Coke, but previous presidents also used it to summon staff. It can be seen on the desks of Presidents Obama and Bush, who introduced this element into presidential furnishings. Joe Biden did not continue the tradition; during his term, the button disappeared from the Resolute desk.
Single responsibility
However, this did not affect the American president's ability to make the decision to launch a nuclear attack independently. The United States is unique in this regard.
When the president of Russia needs a suitcase with the Czeget communication system and the cooperation of the minister of defense or the chief of the general staff (or—according to some sources—both of them) to initiate a nuclear attack, the president of the United States can make the decision alone, although he theoretically should consult with advisors beforehand.
The fate of the world depends on the decision and judgment of one person, who—upon winning the election—begins to shoulder the responsibility associated with potentially ordering a nuclear attack.
Six minutes to decide
Pulitzer Prize-winner Annie Jacobsen discusses this in her recently published book "Nuclear War: A Possible Scenario."
According to the information she acquired, the time window for a decision to activate the American nuclear arsenal is just six minutes. That's how much time the American president has to assess the situation and decide to launch the missiles.
How to start nuclear armageddon?
The initiation of American nuclear weapons is not dependent on the mythical red button, but rather on the "football." This term refers to a black briefcase that the president always has with him, carried by one of the accompanying officers.
Like the Russian Czeget system, the briefcase contains communication tools and several documents with scenarios for a nuclear strike. The president chooses one and confirms his identity using a presidential code card.
The identity—but not the order to attack—is verified in two stages, by the responsible officer and remotely by the Secretary of Defense. Only the identity of the person giving the order and the authenticity of the launch codes are verified, and the passing of the order through the chain of command is supposed to occur automatically.
How do we know the president isn't insane?
This single responsibility for nuclear war, effectively the potential destruction of the world, sparked a debate in the American Senate a few years ago. The issue of security weaknesses was raised: if the president wanted to initiate a nuclear attack for an irrational reason, there were no procedures or legally established ways to stop him.
Doubts are not new—during a 1975 training on the procedure to initiate a nuclear attack, Major Harold Hering asked: "How can I know that an order I receive to launch my missiles came from a sane president?"
Instead of an answer, Major Hering was immediately dismissed from service. The justification failed to demonstrate desired leadership qualities and a military statement that knowing whether an order was issued legally is beyond the competence of the officer tasked with executing it.
