Putin's nuclear gamble: Expanding the parameters of deterrence

The current Russian nuclear doctrine stems from a presidential decree defining the principles of nuclear deterrence. Vladimir Putin signed it on June 2, 2020, developing the principles outlined in the 2014 war doctrine.

It was crafted in response to the geopolitical situation Russia found itself in after the annexation of Crimea from Ukraine and the secession of Donbas and Luhansk. The presidential decree emphasizes that the nuclear arsenal is the primary tool of Moscow's deterrence.

It can be used not only in response to a nuclear attack but also in a situation where a conventional attack threatens the existence of Russia or its allies or threatens to destroy Russia's ability to retaliate with a nuclear strike. In practice, this underscores the importance of the nuclear arsenal, which Russians themselves consider a guarantor of the state's existence.

The Polish Institute of International Affairs points out in one of its analyses that the rules for the use of Russian nuclear weapons are sufficiently general that potential adversaries cannot be certain about the threshold conditions after which Moscow might use them.

This includes, for example, the lack of definition regarding what Russia considers to be allied countries for whose defense nuclear weapons could be used. At the same time, the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons by Russia is relatively high—France, for instance, grants itself more freedom in the use of nuclear weapons.

As recently as 2023, Putin publicly declared that the current doctrine is completely sufficient for Russia. During a meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club in Sochi on the Black Sea, Sergey Karaganov, Chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, raised the issue of the nuclear doctrine, which he considered outdated and not adapted to the current situation.

According to a statement cited by Defence 24, the response from the Russian president was unequivocal: "Why? There is no situation that threatens Russian statehood and the existence of the Russian state today." It seems that since then, Putin has changed his mind.

He expressed this again in mid-2024, during a visit to Vietnam, when he stated that the West aims for a strategic defeat of Russia on the battlefield, which, according to Putin, would equate to the end of Russian statehood.

This statement was confirmed at the beginning of September when Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov announced that the response to Western actions (i.e., support for Ukraine) would be a change in the Russian nuclear doctrine. These announcements were soon confirmed by Putin.

During a session of the Russian Security Council, the Kremlin leader proposed expanding the conditions for the use of the nuclear arsenal. According to the revised doctrine, an attack by a non-nuclear country but supported by a nuclear power also qualifies as a trigger.

This is a clear reference to the realities of the war in Ukraine, which, although equipped with weapons from, among others, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, does not have the freedom to use them to attack targets in Russia but is seeking to obtain this capability.

Putin's declaration is also a confirmation of the serious concerns among Russian decision-makers about the possibility of Ukrainians attacking Russian targets with Western long-range weapons.

The proposals discussed in the Kremlin are accompanied by a change in the narrative presented by the local propaganda. Until recently, the Russian army was touted as the second in the world, invincible, and equipped with the best weapons with "no analogs in the world."

That is no longer current. In a program broadcasted by the public television channel Russia 1, Kremlin propagandist Vladimir Solovyov's guest was military expert, retired colonel Mikhail Khodaryonok.

Solovyov's guest, known for his factual comments on the war in Ukraine, far removed from Kremlin propaganda, unequivocally stated that Russia's chances of winning a conventional war with NATO are zero.

This can be seen as preparing the public for an unfavorable outcome of the war in Ukraine for Moscow. At the same time, these words explain to Russians why the previous, rather cautious nuclear doctrine needs to be changed, according to the Kremlin.

In this context, it is worth noting that even after these changes are introduced, Putin will not be able to start a nuclear war by pressing a symbolic "red button."

Control over the Russian nuclear arsenal is managed by the Czeget communication system (part of the larger government communication network Kazbek), whose visible representation is the black briefcases with communication terminals. These are held by at least three people—the president, the defense minister, and the chief of general staff.

According to currently available information, to activate the nuclear arsenal, the decision of two out of three or, according to other sources, all briefcase holders is required, and the order passes through additional (probably at least seven) layers of the command chain.

An alternative to an order issued through the Czeget system is Russia's "dead hand"—a mechanism for the automatic launch of intercontinental ballistic missiles, which is supposed to act in the event of the destruction of Russian decision-making centers.

This role is attributed to the somewhat mythical Perimeter system. Although its existence has been confirmed, there is little reliable information more recent than 20 years about it. There is not even certainty whether the Perimeter has been activated, and the principles of its operation or the scale of a potential automatic nuclear attack remain in the realm of speculation.