Russia's elusive Su‑75 fighter: Prototype plans spark doubt
The director of the Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft Plant (KnAAZ), Yuri Kondratyev, announced that in 2025, Russia plans to assemble the first two prototypes of the 5th generation Su-75 Checkmate fighter jet. However, several doubts surround the development of this aircraft, which was initially unveiled in 2021 and slated for its maiden flight in 2023. This skepticism is understandable, given the Russian arms industry's ongoing challenges with the production of advanced fighter jets, delivering only a handful of units each year.
The world first became aware of the new 5th generation Su-75 fighter project in 2021, when Russia showcased its model at the MAKS 2021 International Aviation and Space Salon. At the time, little information was disclosed about the aircraft's capabilities and specifications. Despite this, Russia began seeking buyers for the "non-existent" fighter, aiming to market it both domestically and to international clients.
Russia tries to sell a "non-existent" aircraft
Russia primarily targeted India as a potential partner, offering both the aircraft itself and the opportunity to participate in its development. However, India, recalling issues with the PAK FA program and the Su-57 fighter construction program—where there were disagreements over technology transfer and machine specifications—showed little interest in Russia's offer. India also emphasized its commitment to developing its own Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) fighter program.
The attractiveness of the Russian offer was further dimmed by the Kremlin's failure to build a single Su-75 prototype to date, despite initial promises of a first flight in 2023 and the start of serial production in 2026. These plans are now outdated. According to Yuri Kondratyev, the first two Su-75 prototypes are expected to be completed in 2025, although these declarations have raised skepticism as well.
Kondratyev explained that one of the prototypes is intended for ground static tests, and the other for flight tests. He also emphasized that the Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft Plant (KnAAZ), where the aircraft are being developed, will focus on the production of Su-35S and Su-57 fighters in 2025—models currently in active use by Russia in Ukraine.
The plans related to the development and production of these fighters seem ambitious. However, it is important to note that, in 2024, according to data from Military Watch Magazine, Russia delivered a total of 14 batches of combat aircraft to its military in various configurations. These included three batches of Su-57, four batches of Su-35, six batches of Su-34, and one batch of Su-30SM. The exact number of aircraft in each batch remains unspecified.
Analyses by the Ukrainian Defense Express indicate that in 2022, Russia delivered to its military 6 Su-57 fighters, 7 Su-35, 10 Su-34, 4 Su-30SM, and 2 Yak-130 aircraft, totaling 29 new and upgraded machines. In 2023, estimates suggest deliveries of 26 aircraft, including 2 Su-57 (with Russian sources claiming 8), 10 Su-35, 6 Su-34, 4 Su-30SM, and 4 Yak-130. The data indicates that Russia is capable of producing around 30 combat and training aircraft under wartime conditions.
The limitations in Russia's production of new combat aircraft are more severe than they might initially appear. While the Kremlin strives to project an image of technological self-sufficiency, the reality is that sanctions imposed on Russia following the invasion of Ukraine have significantly hindered its military industry's capabilities. A critical issue is access to advanced electronics, aviation components, and dual-use technologies that were previously imported from the West.
The problem is not just about availability and production rate, but also quality. The lack of access to modern components affects reliability and combat effectiveness. It is worth noting that sanctions have cut Russia off from legal supplies of precision integrated circuits, avionics systems, and AESA radar components.
In response, Moscow has attempted to develop its own substitutes, but the outcomes of these efforts remain limited. Russia has also sought to source components through its allies, including obtaining them through smuggling, using false documentation, or purchasing them as civilian components and then adapting them for military use.