Russia eyes NATO vulnerabilities: New threats in Europe looms

Currently, there is no immediate threat of a Russian attack, but the risk will increase over the coming years. If the Kremlin perceives that NATO is weak, Russia could be prepared to start a new, large-scale war in Europe within five years—a key conclusion from the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS) report released by the Danish authorities.

The release of these intelligence analyses comes at a critical time. Soon, it will be the third anniversary of the full-scale war in Ukraine (the conflict itself is longer—it's worth noting that Russia has been targeting Ukraine for 11 years). The anniversary of the Russian aggression is accompanied by geopolitical turmoil stirred by Donald Trump's declarations and actions by the new American administration.

In this context, Danish intelligence outlines three scenarios of Russian aggression, for which the starting point is not Russia's defeat in Ukraine but some form of cessation or freezing of hostilities:

• Six months after the cessation of hostilities, Russia could attack one of its neighbors.
• Two years after the cessation of hostilities, Russia could start a regional war in the Baltic Sea area against several countries simultaneously.
• Within five years after the cessation of hostilities, Russia could rebuild its capability to launch a full-scale attack on Europe.

The need for Russia to rebuild its offensive capabilities stems from significant losses suffered in Ukraine. Even if the reported number of 10,000 destroyed Russian tanks by Kyiv is exaggerated, thousands of destroyed armored vehicles suggest that the Kremlin was forced to empty mobilization warehouses, which stored equipment dating back to the Cold War.

The Russian air force is in an even more difficult situation, as it is gradually deteriorating. Moscow not only produces too few aircraft to replenish current losses but also depletes existing machines without prospects of replacing them. Due to the lack of new aircraft and future-oriented designs, the weakening of Russian military aviation will persist.

Simultaneously, it is worth noting that forecasts about the crisis in the Russian industry and the rapid depletion by Russia of stocks of tanks, ammunition, or ballistic missiles have proven inaccurate.

Although the current production rates and the pace of restoring the operational readiness of stored equipment do not cover the losses incurred, the Russian economy, having shifted to war mode and supported by China in building production capacities, provides weapons in quantities previously unexpected. This is accompanied by deliveries of weapons and ammunition from countries such as Iran and North Korea.

Furthermore, Russia has rebuilt its training system—the waves of "mobiks" sent in 2022 to fight without training and proper equipment are now a thing of the past. According to experts, including Col. Piotr Lewandowski, the average Russian soldier sent to battle is better trained than the Ukrainian soldier.

Moreover, the war in Ukraine is conducted by Russia without resorting to conscription—volunteers, attracted by very high pay, among other incentives, reach the front.

The Russian threat prompts a reaction—countries on NATO's eastern flank and new members of the Alliance are expanding their military capabilities. Industrial capabilities remain a weak point, but in this area as well, the situation is gradually improving.

President Trump's declarations do not necessarily imply a withdrawal of the United States from defending Europe but an attempt to pressure European members of the Alliance to collectively increase defense spending.

In this context, an important aspect of the Danish report is the issue of the Arctic and Russia’s efforts to maintain dominance in the far north. From Moscow's perspective, this is an area of critical importance both economically (due to resources and marine trade routes) and strategically.

Climate change has made the Arctic—previously a safe haven for Russian boomers (nuclear submarines with intercontinental missiles)—accessible for navigation for increasingly longer periods each year, and thus accessible to the naval forces of potential adversaries. This poses a serious challenge for Moscow, as currently, all Arctic countries except Russia are members of NATO.

The Arctic balance of power could, however, be altered by China's involvement, which has officially declared itself a "near-Arctic country" and—by building a fleet of icebreakers—intends to defend its interests in the far north.

In light of these warnings, the Danish report appears not as the most likely scenario of events but as a cautionary note and an indication of actions, the neglect of which could lead to another war in Europe.

In addition to the timelines, it outlines the conditions under which a Russian attack could be launched. The first is the lack of engagement from the United States. The second is NATO’s lack of response to Russian militarization.

The conclusions are clear: Russia is likely to attack only when NATO is weak and fails to enhance its military potential, and when political divisions within the Alliance lead to a withdrawal of the United States from Europe. This serves as a particularly clear directive for NATO countries on necessary actions to prevent Russia from launching another attack in the future.