New leadership attempts to relaunch Russia's floundering space dreams

On Thursday, February 6th, Vladimir Putin appointed a new head of Roscosmos, tasked with revitalizing Russia's space endeavors. Dmitry Bakanov, the newly appointed director-general, takes over from Yuri Borisov.

Bakanov was born in Lenin's City (now Baikonur) in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic in 1985. He graduated from St. Petersburg University of Economics and Finance 22 years later. He quickly entered the space sector, leading companies like the Gonets Satellite System, and served in the Ministry of Transport from 2011 to 2025, becoming Deputy Minister in 2022. Bakanov's background equips him with the experience and skills needed to manage Roscosmos, but he faces significant challenges ahead.

Borisov led the agency from 2022, succeeding Dmitry Rogozin, who had been in charge from 2018 to 2022. Both Borisov and Rogozin were expected to usher Roscosmos into a new era with ambitious plans: more rocket launches, investments in satellite constellations, and a shift from the International Space Station (ISS) to developing its own space station. In reality, very little of this was realized.

Roscosmos directly succeeded the Soviet space program, which lacked a central oversight body. Established by a decree from President Boris Yeltsin on February 25, 1992, Roscosmos faced the same financial crises Russia did in the 1990s. Despite these challenges, commercial flights offered some reprieve. As Russia's economic situation improved under Vladimir Putin, Roscosmos also seemed to rebound, conducting several scientific missions like Koronas Foton and Spektr R. Although there was controversy over the high costs of participating in the ISS, a reorganization from 2013 to 2016 and Rogozin's subsequent leadership brought renewed optimism—albeit briefly.

Under Rogozin, Roscosmos started withdrawing from international projects such as NASA's Lunar Gateway program and the ESA spaceport project in Kourou, French Guiana. Instead, it began collaborating with the Chinese National Space Agency on a lunar base. However, Borisov failed to address the ongoing challenges faced by Roscosmos.

Rocket launches remained scarce. For instance, in 2023, Russia conducted only 19 launches, while the USA launched 110 rockets, and China 66. In the first three quarters of 2024, fewer than 10 Russian rocket launches were successful.

The modern Angara A5 launch vehicle program has experienced significant delays due to technical issues. Although developed since 1995 and featuring its debut in 2014, the Angara A5 has only launched a few times, often facing multiple postponements. For example, a launch scheduled for April last year was delayed first by an issue with a pressure system and again due to an engine start control failure.

Though other countries like the USA, China, and European states also encounter challenges, they possess more substantial resources and technological capabilities. The Vostochny Cosmodrome, a launch site for Angara A5, exemplifies inefficiency: its construction saw over 17,000 violations, leading to 140 criminal cases and estimated losses of several billion rubles.

The satellite situation is similarly problematic. Last year, Borisov announced Russia's aim to have 2,600 satellites in orbit by 2036, including the Sfera system, Russia's equivalent to Starlink. Initially planned for 600 satellites, the number dwindled to 360, with funds eventually secured for only 80 despite a demand for 1,200. Russia intended to produce at least 250 satellites annually, yet Western reports indicate an annual production of only about 15, though theoretically, it could be up to 40. Full production capacity remains unrealized.

The outlook for the Russian Orbital Space Station (ROSS), scheduled to begin construction in 2027 with a crewed flight in 2028, is no better. The station is planned to have up to seven modules by 2035, though the crew would be onboard only part-time as the station is to be highly automated. Even Russian analysts suggest this program might be overly ambitious, echoing the loss of the Luna 25 lunar probe in 2023.

The reasons for Roscosmos's crises are both straightforward and intricate. Fundamentally, they stem from Russia's broader state challenges. Without the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia would face fewer restrictions (since sanctions are not entirely airtight) on accessing Western technologies. Roscosmos might not have been excluded from some Western missions like the ESA's ExoMars rover program, and it would likely have higher revenue from exports. This revenue, primarily from rocket engine sales and services, plummeted by roughly 90% after the invasion.

The war in Ukraine will eventually conclude, leading to the lifting of sanctions over time. However, emerging players like SpaceX, Blue Origin, and state agencies from India and Japan will likely retain their clients, posing stiff competition for Russia. Internally, Roscosmos faces challenges from inefficient management and technical lag, which some analysts fear could be exacerbated by sanctions for 10 to 20 years.

Bakanov now faces a significant challenge. Can he prevent Roscosmos's further decline? It's doubtful. While Bakanov brings substantial administrative and space industry experience, a turnaround won't be easy. The head of Roscosmos may change, but according to Russian reports, Roscosmos remains inefficient, corrupt, and underfunded.