Boeing's F‑47 fighter: A gamble on air supremacy despite woes

NGAD is the American program for building the fighter aircraft of the future. The machine, classified as a 6th-generation fighter, is to guarantee the Pentagon a superiority akin to that provided by the F-22 Raptor—a machine so revolutionary that even now, despite its age, it still surpasses the latest aircraft of potential adversaries.

The NGAD program involves not only the construction of a specific aircraft model but also the entire ecosystem in which the future machine will operate. Its elements include drones supporting it in combat. Part of the NGAD program is also the F/A-XX program, which aims to develop a new carrier-capable aircraft—different from the air superiority fighter but sharing various solutions and components with it.

Until recently, the future of the NGAD program was uncertain due to the predicted high cost of new aircraft, estimated at up to $300 million. For comparison, the currently produced version of the F-35 costs about $87 million (the unit price gradually decreases with the increasing scale of production), and the latest version of the F-15, the F-15EX, costs about $97 million.

Although the Donald Trump administration limited the defense budget and sought significant savings, the future of the NGAD program appears to be secure. In one of his speeches, President Trump not only announced the construction of a new combat aircraft but also revealed its name—F-47, commenting that it is a wonderful number (Donald Trump is the 47th president of the USA).

The president also indicated that Boeing would be responsible for building the new fighter. After decades of consolidation in the American defense sector, Boeing is one of the three major aircraft manufacturers in the United States. It's worth noting that military orders in the USA are allocated such that each aviation corporation—regardless of other production—produces at least one type of modern combat aircraft.

Northrop Grumman is producing the future, stealthy strategic bomber B-21 Raider. The Defense Department plans to order at least 100 units, with production expected to conclude in the mid-2030s.

Lockheed Martin, which produced, among other things, 195 serial F-22 Raptors (production ended in 2012), is currently producing the F-35. The schedule predicts that— for the Pentagon alone— at least 2,456 units (in three variants) will be built, with production continuing until 2044. In addition to this number, foreign orders must be added; Lockheed Martin estimates that total production of the F-35 may reach up to 5,000 units.

The future of Boeing as a manufacturer of combat aircraft was uncertain until recently. Although the corporation is producing the carrier-capable F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, the last order will be completed by the end of 2027. Without foreign orders, this means the closure of the production line.

Boeing is also responsible for producing the latest variant of the F-15, the F-15EX Eagle II. However, instead of the planned approximately 200 units, the Pentagon ordered only 104 aircraft. The situation is somewhat improved by foreign orders from Israel and Saudi Arabia, which is not purchasing new machines but wants to upgrade its existing aircraft to the latest standard.

The scale is limited and, at best, will slightly exceed 100 machines. In this context, lobbying to acquire this type of machine is not surprising.

Therefore, the decision to assign Boeing the production of the F-47 is significant. Even with a limited number of ordered machines, current estimates suggest that the entire program—including service throughout the equipment's life cycle—may mean orders amounting to hundreds of billions of dollars.

All of this happens when Boeing is facing problems that have seriously undermined its credibility. The time when Boeing had a near-monopoly position in the market for large passenger jets has ended with the rapid rise of the European competitor, Airbus.

The response to European competition was supposed to be new Boeing models like the 787 Dreamliner or the next incarnation of the 737 model—Boeing 737 MAX. Both— despite excellent sales—turned out to be major problems, damaging the company's reputation with numerous scandals related to quality control, cost-cutting during both project and execution stages, and solutions that negatively impacted flight safety.

Boeing's aircraft suffered incidents such as overheating batteries, doors falling off during flights, windows popping out, engine cowl pieces falling off, debris found in fuel tanks, and also—what turned out to be the cause of tragic disasters—issues with the system theoretically protecting the aircraft from stalls (a sudden loss of lift that may be accompanied by a loss of control).

As a result, Boeing's sales hits were—by decision of institutions responsible for safety in air traffic—grounded. Such decisions were made in various years by the American FAA and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which even closed airspace over Europe for the 737 MAX model. Problems for this reason were faced by, among others, LOT airlines, operating Boeing jets.

The scale of the public relations disaster was compounded by whistleblower statements—former employees reporting irregularities. One of them was John Barnett (who committed suicide in 2024), who informed the world about the neglect of detected defects or the deliberate installation of defective parts.

Another whistleblower, Sam Salehpour, broadened Boeing’s list of offenses with neglect in the production of Dreamliners and the 777 model and skipping safety procedures during assembly.

The problems in the civilian sector were compounded by setbacks in space exploration. Boeing, which contributed significantly to the Apollo program years ago, suffered a failure in building the Starliner spacecraft.

The new-generation space vehicle, which—according to the company's declarations—was supposed to be ready for flights as early as 2015, eventually embarked on its test flight in 2019. When, after problematic unmanned tests, the Starliner was sent to the International Space Station with a crew, returning the spacecraft to Earth with people on board proved impossible. Due to numerous technical failures, Starliner returned to Earth without a crew.

Although the return went smoothly, the astronauts who were supposed to spend a week in space were trapped in orbit for over six months—instead of returning in August 2024, they returned to Earth only in March 2025.

All these problems demonstrate the substantial credit of trust Boeing received from the American administration, which entrusted it with building a combat aircraft meant to ensure the USA's air supremacy for the coming decades.

Especially since, while the Starliner spacecraft has a counterpart in the SpaceX-developed Crew Dragon capsule, in the case of the combat aircraft, the Pentagon does not have such comfort as NASA. Failure or delays in the construction of the F-47 could mean that American military aviation remains without a new air superiority fighter, with a small fleet of aging Raptors and the non-prospective, 1970s-developed F-15.

Awaiting resolution is also the matter of the F/A-XX program. Although it is part of the NGAD program, it is ultimately intended to develop a carrier-capable aircraft for the Navy. Lockheed Martin has been excluded from the competition, meaning the future carrier aircraft, which is to replace the Super Hornets, will be produced by either Northrop Grumman or Boeing.