Zelensky's journey from hopeful reformer to wartime leader

"I would like our governments to be recorded in the annals of history," said Volodymyr Zelensky, the newly elected president of Ukraine, in 2019. He came to power with record support and an ambitious but straightforward program: to improve the quality of life for Ukrainians, remove corrupt elites, and bring the country into the European Union. The key to success was supposed to be ending the war in the Donbas, which has been ongoing since 2014. Back then, the young and energetic Zelensky couldn't have known that his government would indeed be recorded in history books as the most challenging in Ukraine's history.

His term—marked by the COVID-19 pandemic and the devastating war with Russia—formally ended on the night of May 20 to 21, 2024. However, martial law prohibits holding elections now. It states that in the event of the president's term expiring, the current leader's powers are extended until a new president takes office.

The problem lies in the ambiguous provisions of the Ukrainian constitution. While the constitution's provisions for the Verkhovna Rada, whose term ended in the fall of 2023, are clear—during martial law or a state of emergency, its powers are extended—there is no such provision for the president.

According to Professor Oleksiy Haran, a professor of political science at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and the scientific director of the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, this is not a legal collision. Neither in Ukraine nor in the West does anyone question the legality of Zelensky's continued rule. Only Russia does.

Tatiana Kolesnychenko, Wirtualna Polska: When Volodymyr Zelensky became president of Ukraine in 2019, you assessed him as "a populist who has no idea how to govern a state." Do you still assess him that way?

Prof. Oleksiy Haran: No. Over these five years, we have seen different facets of Zelensky. In the beginning, he was indeed a populist. We doubted whether he could defend Ukraine's interests.

Ironically, when Zelensky came to power, he believed the key to everything was peace with Russia. People from his circle say that he sincerely believed at the time that to end the war in the Donbas, it was enough to "look into Putin's eyes" and "simply stop shooting."

Zelensky did not understand what politics was about. He undertook negotiations with Putin and was ready to make compromises that society did not accept—like withdrawing some troops from the Donbas. Fortunately, he quickly realized that Russia would always want more and more, as its ultimate goal is to destroy Ukraine or install a Kremlin-controlled puppet at its head.

It was then that Zelensky began to change, drifting towards the state. When the full-scale invasion began, we saw a patriot. Maintaining the continuity of government in the first days of the Russian assault was crucial.

And now, what kind of Zelensky do we see? Tired, withdrawn?

Criticized. After the success of the 2022 offensive, we all believed that the war would soon end. But that did not happen. The following year's offensive did not bring the expected results. Disappointment arose, which society directed at Zelensky as the commander-in-chief.

On May 21, Zelensky's first term officially ended. No one questions his right to continue governing, but some Western commentators believe that the president falls into a trap by staying in office without holding elections. Society has not held him accountable so that this argument will resurface with every crisis.

People write all sorts of strange things, often without understanding the situation. We have a war that Europe has not seen in 70 years, and we cannot hold elections. Ukrainian law prohibits voting during martial law. Another article states that the president remains in office until a successor is elected. In short, there will be no elections as long as the war lasts, and Zelensky's continued rule is entirely legal.

There is complete social, political, and legal consensus on both issues. Experts and constitutionalists speak unequivocally—there is no conflict between the regulations. Even the opposition does not challenge this. At the end of last year, the leaders of all parliamentary factions signed a memorandum stating that the next elections would take place only after martial law ends.

That settles the matter. Deputies from opposition parties like Holos or Petro Poroshenko's European Solidarity may criticize Zelensky, but no one denies that he is the president. Only Russia does that.

Putin, though he was himself elected in March in elections not recognized by the world, has already declared that any peace talks will only be held with Ukraine's "legitimate authorities." These speculations about a conflict in Ukrainian law could be put to rest by asking the Constitutional Court for clarification. However, the president's party faction—Servant of the People—did not want to do this. Why?

Indeed, a court decision would have clarified everything. I don't know why they didn't do it. I feel they misjudged the situation. In 2023, they lived in hope for a swift de-occupation and end to the war, and thus also elections. Not approaching the Constitutional Court was a mistake.

Because it was perceived that Zelensky might fear the court's verdict, with which he has a long and conflict-ridden history.

Once again, I will repeat: for Ukrainian lawyers, the situation is clear. There is no legal conflict, and I do not believe the Constitutional Court could issue any other verdict. Why didn't Zelensky's people ensure this? They did not foresee it, missed it, and now they find themselves in this situation.

Research conducted by the Razumkov Center in March of this year showed that almost 60 percent of Ukrainians do not want elections because they would divide the country. These numbers may change, but today, there is no basis for discussing elections.

Elections cannot be held, but support for Zelensky continues to decline. Do you see this as a threat?

The latest surveys showed trust in Zelensky at 58 percent. Is that low?

No, but it is not the 93 percent support seen at the beginning of the invasion, and it has a continuous downward trend.

Zelensky's popularity has come in waves. He was elected with a record result—73 percent. Then—during his term—those ratings decreased, as with all Ukrainian presidents. Once again, in the first year of the invasion, we saw a sharp increase, especially after the success of the 2022 counteroffensive.

Now, Zelensky's popularity is gradually declining, but as I said, it's easy to explain. People did not receive what they expected. Instead of a quick end, the war is dragging on, as we are not receiving enough Western aid to reclaim the occupied territories. This is compounded by corruption scandals and sometimes ineffective communication with society. As a result, all this cumulative dissatisfaction is directed at Zelensky.

So, these declines are natural, and this trend will likely continue. But what's interesting is that even among people who do not trust Zelensky, the prevailing opinion is that elections should not be held during the war. Another solution might be better.

For example, are you creating a broad coalition with the opposition and forming a national unity government, like in the UK during World War II or in Israel in October of last year?

Israel is not the best example because, in reality, the main opposition party did not enter the coalition. However, forming such a government might not be the worst solution for Ukraine.

Is it feasible? Talks on this began at the end of last year and ended up going nowhere.

So far, no proposal has come from the authorities. It is also unknown how the opposition would behave if negotiations began. Politicians remain politicians even during the war. Their rivalry did not stop. Unfortunately, joining forces is not bad, but implementing it might be challenging.

For now, the opposition accuses Zelensky and his circle of having stripped both the parliament and the government of their autonomy, making both institutions branches of the president's office. And Zelensky himself has more power than any president in Ukraine's history.

The war has concentrated power around the president. That is inevitable. But it is worrisome that the government and parliament are managed from Bankova Street [where the president's office is located – ed.]. This means that all the most critical decisions are made in Zelensky's office—by a small circle of his trusted advisors.

Is the war the only reason? As early as 2019, you believed there was a risk of power usurpation by Zelensky's entourage.

These are different situations. Then, Zelensky became president, and his party won an absolute majority in the Verkhovna Rada. So, there was a risk, but I always said that maintaining such significant power would be difficult. And, over time, it broke down into smaller groups.

Moreover, any attempt at power usurpation in Ukraine inevitably led to a Maidan. Before the invasion, when contentious issues arose, such as unjustified compromises with Russia, the opposition would bring people to protest. Under this pressure, the authorities would correct their course. It is the same now: although the opposition is a minority, it still does not let the government do everything it wants. However, it must also be acknowledged that there are attempts to abuse power.

No one embodies this better than Andriy Yermak, the head of Zelensky's office. A man fanatically devoted to him and just as fanatically removing any competition. The dismissals that took place in recent months have shown that Zelensky is not afraid to fire his former associates from the show business era. Still, the problem is that people connected to Yermak are replacing them.

Unfortunately, Zelensky relies primarily on his office and Yermak. A situation where potential competitors of Yermak have been removed can lead to dangerous tendencies. For instance, the president receives information from only one source, or only one power center influences his decisions. This is never good for the state.

There have been rumors for a long time that Yermak might become Ukraine's new Prime Minister. Do you see him in that role?

I don't think Yermak is interested in that. The Prime Minister is responsible for the economy, mobilization, and social payments. Why would he want inevitable criticism and responsibility? Yermak now has a much more interesting situation.

Because he is the power behind the throne?

It's not even that hidden because it is clear. He is simply the number two person in the state. If the president appears somewhere, you can be sure that Yermak is standing to his right. They are always seen together. They have known each other since their show-business days [Yermak was one of the leading specialists in Ukraine in the field of copyright law – ed.]. Zelensky trusts him implicitly, and I think that's a mistake. Yes, he can rely on his closest advisor, but power should have different centers of influence to maintain balance.

Yermak has many scandals, including accusations of playing into Russia's hands. On the other hand, he is praised by Americans. "He is de facto the prime minister, foreign minister, and chief of staff. I know everyone complains about Yermak. But I would say the downside is the war. And I think he is damn effective at his job," said Michael McFaul, former U.S. ambassador to Russia, who is now working with the Biden administration, in an interview with the "Washington Post."

Some of Yermak's actions before the invasion were thought-provoking. During negotiations in Minsk, he signed a draft document on creating a consultative council, including ten representatives from Ukraine and as many separatists.

In other words, he put his signature next to warlords, presented as "legitimate representatives" of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. It was a total failure. Ukrainian diplomacy had worked hard for years to ensure no recognition of the warlords, and he legitimized them with one signature. In the end, under public pressure, the government-backed out, but the bad taste remained.

Is Yermak an effective manager in all this? He knows how to manage, but that doesn’t change the fact that too much power is concentrated in his hands.

According to Ukrainian media sources, he convinced Zelensky until the last moment that there would be no invasion because negotiations with the Russians were going well. Former associates describe Yermak as "like Italian slippers" because he never brings bad news. Are the accusations that Zelensky is becoming detached from reality grounded?

Zelensky is not Putin. No one brings him a folder with selected information. He travels around the country, meets with world leaders, and reads what the media writes. He is not detached from reality. When he came to power, he imagined himself as the savior of Ukraine. Of course, that did not happen. When the invasion started, he became extremely popular again. This might have made him think he knew everything and could rely on the opinion of five or six managers he trusts. This approach led to many mistakes.

Although we hoped for success in 2023, we had to prepare society for the possibility that the war could drag on—that Russia is treacherous and should not be underestimated. The president's office was too confident and, as a result, experienced a wave of disappointment.

On the other hand, it's easy to criticize when you're watching everything from the sidelines and don't have to make the difficult decisions that weighed on Zelensky. Take the first period of the invasion. I can't imagine how he and his people endured that pressure psychologically. Every decision they made could have determined the fate of the entire state. We persevered thanks to the courage and dedication of the Ukrainian people, but Zelensky and his team also contributed—they acted as they should have.

But that was over two years ago. From the perspective of time and corruption scandals, few remember that Zelensky was a source of national pride. Soldiers who objectively have reasons to be dissatisfied, whether due to a lack of demobilization or problems with weapon supplies, often repeat fake information or believe in half-truths.

This situation reminds me of 2019 when the informational landscape was so polarized that no one wanted to listen to rational arguments. Even during martial law, we have freedom of speech, and everyone can criticize the government to such an extent that it harms national security. I find it hard to imagine an Israeli soldier openly criticizing the government, yet such comments are in all our media.

The problem is that currently, 70 percent of information about the war comes from social media. While YouTube has reliable sources, Telegram is just a cesspool. Anonymous channels where you can read that it's all over, that Ukraine is losing, that there is betrayal everywhere. It's so bad that you can only throw up your hands and give up. It's not hard to guess where this narrative originates.

From Russia. But isn't this partially the result of a mistake made by the authorities who wanted to control television? After the invasion, they launched the Telemarathon, a joint news channel that quickly became a propaganda tool for the government. Maybe that's why people started following what's written online.

I constantly criticized the Telemarathon because three opposition stations were not invited. That's not how it should be done. So it's no surprise that the popularity of the Telemarathon systematically drops; people don't trust it. This does not mean, however, that they cannot watch opposition stations. They are still available on cable.

I don't know why people seek information on Telegram. It's high time, however, to develop a strategy to counteract this.

There is an active discussion in Ukraine about blocking Telegram. Would that be a good move?

Mykola Kniazhytskyi, a deputy from Petro Poroshenko's party, proposes a better solution. He developed a draft law that stipulates that anonymous channels with large reach should be registered as media, ending anonymity.

Since at least December 2023, the Russians have been pushing the slogan "Maidan 3" on social media. On countless channels and accounts, Zelensky was mocked and portrayed as a usurper, and there were calls to protest on Maidan on the day his term ended. According to Ukrainian services, it was the Kremlin's most expensive and massive operation. On May 21, no one went out to protest. But can this be considered a defeat for Russia?

Russia failed to bring about "Maidan 3," and I don't think they will succeed in the future. People remain vigilant, which does not mean they do not read nonsense online. The Kremlin will continue its disinformation operation. Their goal is to discredit Ukrainian authorities both in the country and in the West. And since the authorities make mistakes, the Russians have material. They take facts, create a conspiracy theory around them, and highlight everything negative. And people start to believe it because "these are facts."

Ukrainians have reasons for dissatisfaction. Take the scandal over inflated food prices for soldiers. It arouses strong emotions—in me, too—but portraying Ukraine as a failed state where everyone steals is a big exaggeration.

At some point, we started focusing on what is evil. And that is Russia's success, trying to convince us and the whole world that Ukraine is losing. Yes, we might lose Chasiv Yar or Vovchansk, as we depend on Western weapons, which we continuously lack. On the other hand, our perseverance and determination highlight our strength and resilience.