Ukrainian forces suffered heavy losses in the Krynkami assault operation

After nearly a year of fighting in the Dnieper marshes, Ukrainian forces withdrew soldiers from the bridgehead near Krynkami. To this day, it remains unclear what the long-term goals of the command were during this operation. It ended in July with failure and significant losses.

Before the war, Krynkami was a large urban-type settlement. This is how villages resembling eastern European suburban housing estates in the layout are described in the east. Today, it is just a sea of ruins at the mouth of the Konka River to the Dnieper.

The last residents were evacuated in June 2023 when the Russians blew up the dam at Kakhovka. At that time, Ukrainians began conducting the first reconnaissance diversion raids to disperse Russian forces before the planned summer counteroffensive.

After over two months, however, the counteroffensive stalled, and the Russians launched a series of strikes on Avdiivka, Marinka, and Vuhledar. Ukrainians needed a public relations success to show the West that aid was not in vain, and to assure their own society that the army was still reclaiming lost territories. The idea of conducting an assault near Krynkami then emerged.

On October 20, Ukrainians launched an assault near Krynkami, surprising the Russians and quickly establishing a stronghold. For the following weeks, the fighting primarily took place on the Dnieper, where Ukrainians organized raids on one side. At the same time, the Russians attempted to seize the Dnieper islands to control river traffic.

In the water skirmishes, Ukrainians usually had the upper hand, possessing a river flotilla on the Dnieper equipped with units adapted to operations in shallow waters. The Russians had to use hastily armed, captured civilian motorboats.

In the narrow straits between the islands, Galaxy Trident 26-ft boats produced by the Ukrainian company Brig Motors fought. These semi-rigid hull units can transport 12 soldiers at 51 mph and are armed with a 0.3-inch machine gun. Larger but better-armed Defiant 131-ft cutters were used less frequently, tasked with providing fire support to smaller units.

At least three amphibious transport units also participated in the operations near Krynkami. They were converted from requisitioned river tour boats into "ships." This was possible because the R-51 project tour boats, known as "Moscows," were designed for quick conversion into amphibious ships. This is evident from the window design, which allows for quick replacement of glass with steel plates, and the way they open, enabling an amphibious assault.

Unfortunately, larger river units were quickly withdrawn from the fighting near the bridgehead. This was especially true for the slower, older, heavy BMK-T cutters, several of which were destroyed by drones. Once artillery and drones took over the brunt of the fighting on both sides, soldiers on land and river units became easy targets.

During six weeks of the heaviest winter fighting, Ukrainians lost about 50 cutters—either damaged or sunk. The Russians suffered similar losses.

With the arrival of Russian rocket and tube artillery, Ukrainians at the bridgehead were pounded daily, followed by attacks from the 24th, 26th, and 28th mechanized infantry regiments, as well as the 17th armored regiment of the 70th Mechanized Division. Ukrainian resistance soon turned a small tactical raid into a large operation, concentrating significant Russian forces.

The lack of progress forced the Kremlin to deploy elite units. Among them were the 328th Air Assault Regiment of the 104th Guards Airborne Assault Division and the 810th Guards Marine Brigade. At times, the Ukrainian bridgehead was surrounded by about 4,000-5,000 Russians.

Meanwhile, Ukrainians maintained a maximum of 350 people in Krynkami at any one time. Moreover, these soldiers were without heavy equipment. The shoreline conditions, the small number of amphibious craft to transport tanks, and the large number of drones in use over the Dnieper meant that the marine infantry could only rely on their own artillery and drones for support.

It reached a point where soldiers at the bridgehead became just a lure. When the Russians attacked, Ukrainian artillery and drones crushed subsequent assaults. For instance, on December 9, the independent battalion "Madjar Birds," commanded by Robert "Madjar" Browdi, destroyed four out of five tanks and all six armored personnel carriers attacking Krynkami.

On December 18, the TOS-1A rocket system, firing thermobaric warhead missiles, and the latest Russian T-90 tank were destroyed. On December 24, desperate Russians used banned chemical weapons in the village. Even then, they failed to defeat the Ukrainian marine infantry.

The widespread use of loitering munitions characterized the fighting for the bridgehead near Krynkami. Ukrainians primarily used F-7T and Gryphon quadcopters, which can carry mortar grenades.

In two weeks of December fighting, the destruction of over 40 armored vehicles was confirmed. Analysts from the Oryx project calculated that by January 5, Russians had lost 150 various armored vehicles and, in the next six months, another approximately 500 vehicles.

Russians also used Lancet loitering munitions and FPV drones. Thanks to drones, they managed to cut off communication with the right bank of the river. They forced Ukrainians to operate at night, which left soldiers at the bridgehead almost without the ability to rotate and deliver supplies.

The fighting near Krynkami took place in very difficult, marshy terrain, where it was hard to dig in. Dramatic stories of soldiers fighting there appeared on social media. In theory, they were supposed to be rotated roughly every week, but in practice, units were replaced once every two to three weeks. One of the record-holders, who earned the nickname "Lucky" at the bridgehead, spent 72 days there—from December 2, 2023, to February 14, 2024. He indeed had to be lucky to come out of that slaughter alive.

Ukrainians tried to rotate soldiers from the 35th, 36th, 37th, and 38th Marine Infantry Brigades, forming small combat groups. Unfortunately, even this was very difficult to accomplish. The wounded had priority for evacuation, and there were so many that the scarce river forces could not accomplish all the tasks. Many marine infantry soldiers drowned during the crossing—due to their injuries, they did not have the strength to swim, and others drowned because of the heavy equipment they were carrying during the crossing.

"We tried to gather all the dead on the shore to take them away, but a boat would arrive, and they would start covering them with fire. Many died there. Dozens," said Bogomoł, a medic from the 2nd Battalion of the 37th Marine Brigade, on slidstvo.info.

"As soon as we had a wounded, we immediately informed that a boat should be sent at night. Many boats did not come; it happened that boys lay with severed limbs for 10 days, and the boats could not reach us," described "Lucky" in an interview with the same service.

By the end of June 2024, 788 Ukrainian soldiers were missing. Most likely, they are dead. The bodies of 262 killed infantrymen were transported to the right bank. Over 2,000 were wounded.

Ukrainian staff officers are still cautious when evaluating the operation. They emphasize that a lot of Russian equipment was destroyed. There is no answer, however, as to whether it was worth the bloodshed of marine infantry soldiers.