Ukrainian counteroffensive: "Everything has gone wrong"

Against expectations, the Ukrainian counteroffensive did not see substantial success on the front line. The reasons for this failure are currently being explored. Journalists from The Washington Post joined the critical analysis, expressing in their detailed review that the Ukrainian counteroffensive did not proceed as it should have.

On June 7, when the Ukrainian armed forces initiated their counterattack in the Zaporozhian region, military strategists forecasted that within the first 24 hours, the front line would be pushed back around 8.7 miles towards the Russian positions, reaching Robotyne. This was supposed to instigate an assault on Melitopol and disrupt enemy supply lines during an operation aimed at reaching the coast of the Sea of Azov, according to The Washington Post.

The reality on the front line, however, turned out to be notably different. The Ukrainians succeeded in capturing Robotyne only after 12 weeks of intense, grueling combat that drained their forces.

In conversation with the newspaper, Ukrainian commanders emphasized that the causes for this situation were complex. The primary factor turned out to be the density of Russian minefields. In an area of roughly 2.1 square miles, the invaders deployed up to 20,000 mines.

Other significant factors include underestimation of the role of combat drones on the front line, inadequate combat experience of Ukrainian soldiers, improper training, and differences of opinion regarding the priority of operations. These differences quickly became apparent in dealings with the Americans, according to the study.

Soldiers were trained to operate Bradley combat vehicles on a territory completely different from the muddy lands of the Zaporozhian region, specifically a center in Germany. Moreover, about 70 percent of the personnel of one of the key brigades participating in the counteroffensive were inexperienced soldiers. To worsen matters, the US command pressured Kyiv to concentrate nearly all strike forces in the Melitopol direction. In contrast, the Ukrainians opted to distribute their troops on three fronts and direct valuable formations to fight near Bachmut, according to The Washington Post. The paper cited these factors contributing to the failed counteroffensive.

"On the fourth day of the operation, Valeriy Zaluzhny, the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian army, had had enough. Burned Western military equipment including American Bradleys, German Leopard tanks, and vehicles for mine removal littered the battlefield. The number of casualties undermined morale," stressed the analysis.

It was added that the initial difficulties suffered prompted the Ukrainian command to alter tactics. Despite American recommendations for a massive mechanized forces assault, supported by artillery, the Ukrainians opted for the actions of small groups of around ten people moving on foot. Realizing a swift breakthrough of enemy positions would not happen, Kyiv decided to preserve soldiers' lives and military equipment, as reported by The Washington Post.

By the fourth day, it was clear that the operation, prepared for several months, had essentially failed. Meanwhile, it was initially expected that Ukrainian units would reach the Sea of Azov within just two or three months, as noted in the study.

Reportedly, Ukraine and the USA quickly began to blame each other for what they believed were the wrong decisions of the other side. Washington stated that the Ukrainian command fell short at basic military skills, such as effective reconnaissance of the terrain before battle and gathering information about the density of Russian minefields. Conversely, Kyiv criticized the Americans for failing to comprehend how drone attacks transformed the situation on the front line.

The long period of intense combat operations, lasting from February 2022 to June 2023, inflicted a hefty toll on the Ukrainian army. Western observers estimated that about 130,000 soldiers were either killed or injured. Consequently, the battalions participating in the counteroffensive were largely composed of newly conscripted soldiers, which affected their performance, highlighted The Washington Post.

The failure was also attributed to the misguided belief by the Ukrainian side that young commanders, without being influenced by a Soviet mentality, could quickly adapt to NATO force tactics. As a result, the command of one of the units was led by a 28-year-old, and his deputy was a 25-year-old officer, whose lack of experience was apparent.

The "standstill" in the war was explicitly announced by Kyiv only on November 1, when General Zaluzhny gave an interview to the British weekly Economist. The commander in chief admitted that Ukraine was unlikely to achieve a significant and noteworthy breakthrough, reminded the American daily.