Ukraine's mobile intervention groups take down 18 airborne threats
During the night of July 17 to 18, 2024, Ukrainians managed to shoot down 16 Shahed 131/136 drones and two cruise missiles from the Kh-59/69 family. Here’s how mobile intervention groups are handling this threat.
The Commander of Ukraine’s Air Force, Lieutenant General Mykola Oleschuk, posted on Telegram about the downing of 18 out of 19 targets. From the Kursk area, 16 Shahed-131/136 drones were reported to have flown in, and from the south, three cruise missiles, two of which were Kh-59/69. It seems only the Kh-35 broke through.
The defense against the attack involved anti-aircraft systems, units using electronic warfare systems, and light mobile intervention groups. The latter is a precious asset for Ukraine in combating simple targets such as Shahed drones.
Mobile intervention groups — a simple solution to a persistent problem
Iranian drones pose a severe threat to Ukrainian society, prompting authorities to deploy missile defense systems that could be used elsewhere. Due to their low cost, combating these drones is economically feasible only with specialized systems like Gepard, ZSU-23-4 Shilka, or 2K22 Tunguska.
However, these are not available in sufficient numbers, so with great luck and a distance of about 0.6 miles or less, it’s possible to destroy drones using small arms. In response to shortages, Ukrainians have created special teams equipped with machine guns and vehicles with spotlights.
These are often large-caliber machine guns like the Browning M2 caliber .50 BMG, Soviet-era DSzK, or NSW caliber 12.7x108 mm. Still, there are also anti-aircraft guns like the M75 caliber 20 mm or vintage Maxim M1910/30 machine guns.
Adding thermal sights and, for example, a laser rangefinder to these weapons, which allows accurate distance measurement to a target, makes it possible for a skilled shooter to shoot down drones effectively. Shaheds are simple constructions flying in a straight line at a constant speed, making it highly likely that shooting with a lead will be successful.
These groups often possess several handheld anti-aircraft systems like the FIM-92 Stinger or similar systems for more challenging targets like cruise missiles.
These pick-up groups are in constant radio contact and dispatched to regions where radars or, for example, a network of microphones detect incoming drones. Thanks to such groups in pickups, Ukraine can utilize more expensive anti-aircraft systems like NASAMS or IRIS-T to target stricter objects like Kh-101 missiles instead of wasting costly missiles on drones made from hobbyist parts.
