Trump's return: A new era of US‑Iran tensions looms

During his first term, Donald Trump pursued a decidedly anti-Iranian foreign policy. In 2018, he withdrew from the nuclear agreement with Iran, which he called the "worst deal in history," and then imposed harsh sanctions on every sector of the Iranian economy. Simultaneously, the Trump administration began threatening EU member states, Russia, and China with so-called secondary sanctions if they continued trading with Iran.

The policy, which the Trump administration called the "maximum pressure policy," hit the Iranian economy hard yet failed to achieve its goal of forcing Iran to negotiate a new agreement. The new agreement would regulate issues beyond Iran's nuclear activities, including Iran's ballistic missile program and the pro-Iranian network of militias operating in the Middle East (the so-called Axis of Resistance).

President Biden's administration attempted to reset relations with Iran and return to the nuclear agreement but failed. After Russia invaded Ukraine, Biden's team quietly allowed Iran to increase oil exports to protect global markets from rising oil prices.

As a result, in the summer of 2024, Iranian oil exports reached around 1.7 million barrels per day, the best result since the US withdrew from the nuclear agreement. It's no surprise that Trump's associates have harsh words for the outgoing administration, calling Biden's policy toward Iran "appeasement."

Signals from the president-elect's camp indicate that when Donald Trump returns to the White House in January 2025, he will resume the "maximum pressure policy" used against Iran during his first term. However, since "maximum pressure" did not work from 2016 to 2020, it is hard to expect it to be effective now.

Iran's international situation has significantly changed. Therefore, a "course correction" may be necessary, opting for bolder steps that could include the use of military forces—not necessarily American ones. In the Middle East, there is one US ally who would happily undertake this "dirty work" (i.e., an attack on Iran).

During Donald Trump's first term, Americans discouraged Russia and China from trading with Iranians by threatening so-called secondary sanctions on Russian and Chinese companies. However, this time, Trump's team might face more resistance, especially from Russia.

The war in Ukraine has changed Moscow's approach to Iran. Previously, Russia - not wanting to enter into conflict with the USA - withdrew from most economic projects in Iran. However, now that Russia is under sanctions, Russian-Iranian economic cooperation is thriving, as evidenced by deliveries of Iranian arms to Russia and Russian investments in the International North-South Corridor (INSTC), which connects Russia, through Iran, with India. As long as the war in Ukraine continues and Moscow is under sanctions, Russia will not limit contact with Iranians.

Similarly, it will be difficult to force the Chinese to limit trade with Iran. The stakes are high, as 90% of Iran's oil exports go to China (about 1.5 million barrels per day).

Unlike in 2018, Iranian oil is bought not by large Chinese state-owned enterprises but by so-called "teapot refineries"—small, private refineries that trade with Iran in Chinese currency, thus bypassing American sanctions.

Iran's relations with Russia and China are, therefore, much stronger than they were in 2018, when Trump withdrew from the nuclear agreement. However, every stick has two ends. In this case, Trump may count on an unexpected ally, the European Union, during the "second round" with Iran.

In 2018, EU member states criticized Iran's withdrawal from the nuclear agreement, but the situation is quite different now. Due to Iran's military support of Putin in the aggression against Ukraine, the EU will likely side with Trump in the upcoming confrontation with Iran. EU support could have significant implications. In Washington, an option is being considered to use EU countries to trigger the so-called "snapback mechanism" and restore sanctions previously imposed by the UN on Iran before the nuclear agreement was concluded.

Trump also benefits from Iran's weakening role in the Middle East and the failures that the pro-Iranian Axis of Resistance has suffered in recent months in its confrontation with Israel. The political and military leadership of Hamas has been eliminated, most Hamas units have been crushed, and the Gaza Strip is completely devastated.

The Lebanese Hezbollah has also suffered several powerful blows: the organization's leadership (headed by Hassan Nasrallah) has been removed, part of the missile arsenal destroyed, and thousands of fighters killed. An even greater blow for the Iranians was the loss of their Syrian ally, Bashar al-Assad, without whom Iran has lost a direct connection to Lebanon and Hezbollah.

After a little over a year of struggles with Israel, only a memory remains of the former power of the Axis of Resistance. Currently, Iran can only rely on Shiite militias in Iraq and Yemeni Houthis. Worse yet, the failures of the Axis of Resistance and Israel's victories have greatly bolstered Prime Minister Netanyahu's position, who—according to some Israeli media—is already preparing for a military strike on Iran's nuclear program.

According to Donald Trump's associates, the president-elect is still developing his strategy toward Iran. Their statements indicate that the goal—similar to 2018—will be to reach a new agreement with Iran, not to overthrow the Islamic Republic. The basis of Trump's strategy will be a return to the "maximum pressure policy," but—unlike in 2018—this time, Trump intends to pay more attention to military aspects and a direct strike on Iran's nuclear program.

Statements from Donald Trump's associates suggest that the president-elect does not intend to use American military forces against Iran. Trump leans more toward a scenario where Americans provide extensive support to Israel, and it is the Israeli air force that conducts strikes on facilities used in Iran's nuclear program.

Prime Minister Netanyahu would certainly accept such a plan. After the recent defeats that Israel inflicted on the pro-Iranian Axis of Resistance, Netanyahu is determined to tackle the Islamic Republic finally.

However, an Israeli attack on Iranian research facilities carries significant danger. Part of Iran's nuclear program is conducted in centers hidden deep underground, giving them a chance to survive any Israeli attack. In such a situation, Iran would likely shed all restraints and attempt to construct nuclear weapons.

Therefore, paradoxically, Trump's and Netanyahu's policy might lead to the very scenario it intends to prevent—a "nuclear-armed Iran."