Tisza's rise challenges Orbán's long reign in Hungary polls

It was the autumn of 2006 when a recording of then-Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány was made public. During a closed party meeting in May 2006, he admitted to lying to Hungarians during the spring election campaign. The recording, released nearly six months later, led to massive protests, the largest since 1989. Since then, Orbán has remained consistently strong.

But about six months ago, a new player entered the political scene.

Péter Magyar has been hailed by public opinion, including European, as the "leader of the opposition" and the only viable alternative for power in Hungary. While the polls are impressive, the situation is not entirely straightforward.

Magyar is somewhat like a Robin Hood of Hungarian politics. Until February 2024, he lived in abundance, enjoying all the privileges of Viktor Orbán's system—the very system he is now trying to dismantle.

Magyar seized the momentum to enter politics. The breakthrough moment came on February 10 of this year, when President Katalin Novák resigned from office. This was related to a scandal involving the pardon of a person involved in covering up pedophilia. At the same time, Judit Varga, the politician who, as Minister of Justice, signed the pardon request, also withdrew from political life. Magyar is her ex-husband, and the dirty laundry of their relationship breakdown was aired publicly.

Péter Magyar's motto became "do not be afraid"—he directly states that this refers to John Paul II. From the beginning, he portrayed himself as someone who knows the system inside out, so he has the necessary "dirt" on it and knows how to overthrow it.

In just nine months in politics, he ran for the European Parliament, introduced seven MEPs into it, and in polls, has surpassed Orbán's coalition. Magyar did not create a party from scratch, as he wouldn't have managed to do so before the EP elections. He took over a "dormant" and registered group, which he completely reformed. TISZA stands for "Tisztelet és Szabadság Párt," or the Respect and Freedom Party. It is also the name of Hungary's second-largest river, which has inspired the group's slogan "Tisza flows," implying that its current will wash away Fidesz-KDNP.

It's worth noting that the promised revelations from Magyar include only a recording of a conversation with his then-wife about one of the proceedings. There is no "spilling" of data or information that could bring people to the streets. Magyar has followed the opposition's programmatic assumptions, which primarily aim to defeat Orbán. He mentioned 21 points or postulates on the national holiday of March 15, but these lack specific ideas for addressing issues troubling Hungarians.

Some might argue that his program draws interest from a more sophisticated audience, but there is no specific stance from Magyar himself on issues important to Hungarians, such as healthcare, education, and media. His statements are general demands for freedom, pluralism, and funding. He did say a little more last Wednesday.

Magyar is a man of conservative views, positioned closer to the non-radical line of Fidesz-KDNP from years ago, which is why he is sometimes described as a "soft" version of Fidesz.

He is against corruption (which he accuses the ruling majority of), pro-European (he does not wish to deepen integration but maintain the strong role of national parliaments), and his stance on Ukraine is almost identical to Orbán's. Last week in the European Parliament, there was a vote regarding financial aid to Ukraine. Only liberal opposition MPs voted in favor. One MEP from the far-right party Our Homeland voted against, and Fidesz-KDNP MPs "pretended" not to be present by removing their voting cards. TISZA MEPs abstained from voting (as the only ones from the European People's Party faction). Péter Magyar himself did not appear at the vote at all.

A new quality in political life is Magyar's way of communicating with voters. He organized a crowdfunding campaign both for current activities and for running in the 2026 elections, with different membership levels based on donation amounts.

The basic membership level is available for 3,000 forints per month (around $8), while the VIP level is over 41,000 forints (around $113).

Magyar is active on a Facebook group he founded, where he communicates and interacts with voters. In July, after the Russian shelling of the Okhmatdyt hospital in Kyiv, a discussion arose in the TISZA group about Hungary's approach to the war, the fact that Orbán is not condemning Russia, and Hungary is not helping enough. Magyar organized a donation drive for Kyiv, packed his characteristic van (spray-painted in Hungarian national colors), and drove to Kyiv with aid.

He organized similar support in Hungary by delivering fans and hygiene supplies to hospitals.

On Wednesday, October 23, Hungary's national holiday, Magyar revealed a bit of his plan to seize power in the spring of 2026. His aim is to address 16 years of Fidesz-KDNP rule, although this is practically impossible as the justice system is almost entirely subordinate to Orbán. By joining the European Public Prosecutor's Office and tackling mismanagement, Hungary is expected to unlock European funds—money needed to inject new life into the entire country.

Magyar wants to restore Hungary's international reputation, rebuild the Visegrad Group, and improve social conditions enough to reduce the number of Hungarians living below the subsistence level. He promised to increase pensions and the minimum wage. He also pledged to amend the constitution to limit the prime minister to two terms.

The TISZA leader said that preparations for the election program are underway, based on social consultations and the work of 65 working groups. He also announced the start of recruitment for 106 TISZA candidates who will run in single-member districts. This was proclaimed by the opposition portal Telex as the "political X-factor." Candidates must be patriotic, have their ideas, and be talented.

The momentum of TISZA is impressive. In two consecutive polls, Magyar is surpassing Fidesz-KDNP. Although the differences fall within the margin of error, the coming months may favor Magyar as a contender against Orbán.

His presence on the political scene has led to extreme polarization. His main electoral support base, according to the 21 Kutatóközpont survey, includes the existing opposition (13%) and a small percentage of undecided voters (6%). The voter flow from Fidesz-KDNP is just 3%. In the polls, only Fidesz and TISZA seem to have a chance of entering the future parliament—two groups with right-wing origins.

This situation vividly resembles a decade ago when Fidesz and Jobbik were vying for leadership on the right, with Jobbik eventually defeated.

Orbán refers to Magyar as a potential puppet government representative, managed by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, and the leader of the European People's Party, of which TISZA is a member—Manfred Weber. The narrative surrounding Magyar revives the story from the 2022 elections, where the prime minister warned that the opposition would drag Hungary into war (by sending soldiers). This story is now being constructed around Magyar.

The optimism with which European public opinion views Magyar clashes with systemic realities. The entire electoral system and code have been amended over the years to ensure victory for Fidesz-KDNP, even when it theoretically garners fewer MPs.

The electoral system is complex; voters cast ballots on two lists—national (93 MPs) and single-member districts (106 MPs). The law provides a winner's and loser's bonus, which causes millions of "mathematical" votes to affect the final division of seats in parliament, typically benefiting Fidesz.

There is another problem. Even if TISZA were to win and gain more MPs in parliament, the country would almost certainly face paralysis. Since the 1990s, quasi-constitutional laws in Hungary require a two-thirds majority (133 MPs) for amendments. Originally, these laws numbered dozens, but since 2010, every politically significant law has been secured by Fidesz-KDNP with a clause requiring a two-thirds majority for changes.

This situation makes it impossible to change not just the constitution, but also the electoral law, family law, and criminal codes.

The key issue is for Magyar to eventually clarify how he intends to overcome this challenge. It seems impossible for him to defeat Fidesz on democratic principles alone enough to rewrite Hungary altogether.