Russian navy's decline: Aging fleet faces modern challenges

The missile cruisers of project 1144 are large ships. They weigh 28,700 tons, have hulls 827 feet long, and are powered by two nuclear reactors, which provide unlimited range. These ships also feature 20 launchers for anti-ship missiles P-700 Granit, each 33 feet long and weighing 15,400 pounds. Additionally, there are 12 launchers for anti-aircraft missiles of the S-300F Fort system, shorter-range launchers, and strong artillery.

The Soviet Union built four such units in the 1970s and 80s—one under project 1144 and three improved ones representing project 11442. The construction of large ships was part of an ambitious plan to transform the Soviet navy into an ocean fleet capable of challenging the US Navy.

Forty years ago, the specifications of the project 1144 missile cruisers might have been impressive, but today, the pride of the Russian fleet is akin to a "blind boxer"—a unit with theoretically strong offensive armament but dramatically outdated sensors, helpless against modern electronic warfare techniques, and incapable of self-defense. The fate of the cruiser "Moskva" (a unit half its size, representing project 1164), which was destroyed by Ukrainians, illustrates what can happen when sending an outdated ship into battle.

The Russians are aware of the weaknesses of the last large ships in their fleet. That is why two of the four project 1144 units were decommissioned in the early 21st century, and the flagship of the Northern Fleet, "Peter the Great", will soon head to the repair yard. This will occur once the modernization of its sister ship, "Admiral Nakhimov", is completed. The current plan is for "Nakhimov" to return to service in 2026, and for "Peter the Great" to be removed from the fleet in 2030.

The issue is that the Russian cruiser has been under repair since 1997. It's worth noting that, as with the 18-year construction of the Polish corvette ORP "Ślązak", an extremely long repair or construction time does not mean continuous work has been carried out over the years. The work was started, interrupted, and then resumed many times—depending on current political decisions.

Even so, the service history of the Russian cruiser is unusual. Launched in 1986 and incorporated into the fleet in 1988, the ship went to the repair yard in 1997 and has not left since. In the last decade alone, the Kremlin announced that the large ship would return to service in 2018, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, and now claims it will happen in 2026. Ukrainians estimate—though it's difficult to verify the accuracy of these estimates—that the cost of modernization could already amount to $5 billion.

A glimmer of hope for the completion of this extensive repair is the news that one of the two KN-3 nuclear reactors, each with a capacity of 201,000 horsepower, powering "Admiral Nakhimov," has been restarted. According to Ukrainian sources, this occurred as early as December 20, 2024, but Russian media reported it with a significant delay.

The rebuilding of "Admiral Nakhimov", although it will not transform it into a modern warship, is expected to significantly enhance its capabilities. This involves installing an 80-container vertical launcher of the UKSK 3C14 system. It's the Russian equivalent of the Western Mk 41 VLS launchers, allowing warships to carry varied armaments depending on their missions, placed in hidden under-the-deck vertical launchers.

Thanks to this upgrade, the old ship will be able to launch modern Russian missiles to attack ships and land targets, such as Zircon, Onyx, or Kalibr. Eighty starting containers are considerable for the Russian fleet. It's noteworthy that American Ticonderoga-class cruisers, with three times smaller displacement, are armed with 122 Mk 41 VLS launchers.

The potential return of "Admiral Nakhimov" to service will undoubtedly be presented by Russian propaganda as a great success and a significant boost to the navy. Years ago, the TASS agency, when announcing the return of "Nakhimov" to service, described it as the most powerful warship in the world.

This is obviously false, and the facts are quite different. The Russian navy, which still aspired to be an ocean fleet in the 1980s, is steadily eroding and losing its capabilities.

The largest Russian warship—the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov—has been undergoing problematic repairs for so long that Russian naval aviation has effectively ceased to exist, just like the trained crew of the ship, part of which was sent as infantry to the war in Ukraine.

The two nuclear missile cruisers are "Admiral Nakhimov", still undergoing endless repairs, and "Peter the Great", which continues to await repair. Two smaller conventionally powered cruisers, "Varyag" and "Marshal Ustinov", are contemporaries of "Moskva" with similar capabilities.

Russia can still organize propaganda cruises to Cuba or joint patrols with China near Japan or Alaska. Still, in terms of potential, its navy is a shadow of the maritime power the Soviet Union tried to build years ago.

Russian shipyards continue to build frigates, corvettes, submarines, and new landing ships, but the number of new units is insufficient to replace older, decommissioned ships and rejuvenate the fleet generationally.

The propaganda claims about plans to build new-generation large warships, such as a nuclear aircraft carrier based on the project 1143.7 developed back in the 1980s, can be considered entirely unreliable. The peak of Russian capabilities seems to currently be the delayed completion of the large helicopter-carrying landing ships of project 23900 Priboj.

This does not mean the threat from Russian warships should be underestimated. This is especially important in the Baltic, where—although the capabilities of Russian surface units are limited—submarines remain a significant threat.

Although the Russian-developed project 677 (Lada class) proved unsuccessful, producing old, proven units of project 636 (now 636.3) continues. Some of them are not only armed with torpedoes but can also launch Kalibr cruise missiles from underwater, posing a threat to navigation and land targets.