Russian "hydraulic press" strategy strains Ukrainian defenses

The internal destabilization of Russia, inflicting maximum losses on its troops, and finally forcing the enemy to withdraw some forces from Donbas—this was the intention when Ukraine entered the Kursk region in August 2024.

Initially, the last two of these goals were achieved. At the beginning of September, General Oleksandr Syrskyi said that thanks to the Kursk operation, the situation in the Donbas had stabilized. Today, the official optimism of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian army has waned—September and October turned out to be record-breaking months for Ukrainians in terms of territorial losses.

In October alone, they lost over 200 square miles of territory in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Therefore, Syrskyi no longer ignores the reality.

"The situation remains difficult and tends to worsen. The enemy, utilizing their numerical superiority, continues offensive actions and concentrates their main efforts on the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions," said Syrskyi in a conversation with General Christopher Cavoli, Commander of Allied Joint Forces in Europe.

Although the overall frequency of Russian attacks in Donbas has fallen by nearly half in the last week, the Russians continue to press and move forward, even though they also face significant issues with regular supplies of ammunition and vehicles.

Their latest actions illustrate the specifics of the ongoing battles. Although the entire front is about 900 miles long, the Russians are conducting active operations over a total width of only 30 miles, with individual strikes as narrow as 100-150 yards. However, it is not the width of the strike but the location that is crucial. This method of attack can be compared to the operation of a hydraulic press—pressing hard in one place, the Russians expect the Ukrainian defensive lines to eventually break, allowing subsequent units to enter the breach.

In this way, the Russians try to create corridors on the flanks of Ukrainian units, getting behind them. To avoid encirclement, the Ukrainians must align their defense line and retreat by several hundred yards.

Currently, the Russians again lack the strength to strike at a pace similar to the last two months. Near Kupiansk, they advanced only about 100 yards over the course of a week on a front 500 yards wide. At the same time, near Kreminna, they gained 150 yards of territory, although they claim they have advanced more than twice as far.

Temporarily, the focus of the fight has shifted from the Pokrovsk section to the Kurakhove section, where battles are ongoing around the Kurakhove Reservoir, which was blown up on November 11th. By destroying the dam on the Volcha River, the Russians hoped to flood Ukrainian positions. They did not achieve their goal and hindered their own advance—the water spread over the polders, preventing the use of heavy equipment.

After failing on the southern bank, the Russians had to shift the focus of their attacks to the north, where they resumed assaults on Illinka, Berestky, and Novoselydivka with the forces of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade.

They managed to enter Illinka but soon encountered difficulties. In this area, the Ukrainians based their defense on oxbow lakes, ravines, and a road on an embankment connecting Berestky with Voznesenka and further with Tsukuryne. From the direction of the latter locality, they are attempting to attack along the road to trap the Ukrainians in a pocket on the north bank of the reservoir.

This Russian effort, despite heavy human losses, seems pointless. But only on the surface. Capturing Kurakhove would allow the invaders to create another "pocket" between Novoukrayinka, Vuhledar, and Uspenivka, forcing the Ukrainians to retreat and straighten the front line once again.

According to Ukrainian intelligence, the Russians are currently transferring another 60,000-70,000 troops to Pokrovsk. Serhiy Dobriak, head of the military administration in Pokrovsk, claims that in his area of responsibility, the Russians maintain an advantage of ten to one.

After regrouping—probably in about 10-12 days—the Russians will resume attacks on the southern section of the front in the Donbas. County Pokrovsk is one of the most important targets of the Russian operation—it is a major communication hub where railroad lines intersect.

Capturing Pokrovsk would secure the southern flank of the attack on Chasiv Yar and Toretsk, for which the Russian army is preparing. Near Toretsk, troops of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division have already been identified, having returned to the front after reorganizing in the rear.

The Russians last attacked the northern section of the front in Donbas nearly a month ago and are currently stalled in Toretsk, where fierce urban fighting continues. Putin's forces currently occupy about 20 percent of the city's territory.

The Russians still lack the strength for constant pressure along the entire front. Putin's forces are unable to attack in five to seven directions, as they did last year. Their strength suffices to conduct offensives in two main directions—Pokrovsk and Kurakhove. In the other sections, there is relative calm, with the scale of attacks limited to several to a dozen daily.

After expending forces in one direction—in this case, Kurakhove—they launch an attack in another, near Toretsk, using the break to bring up reserves to the first direction. By operating in this specific "overlap," they can continuously engage Ukrainian forces.

In this way, they can also steadily move towards the borders of the Donetsk region. Capturing the entire Donbas up to its pre-war administrative boundaries is a goal Putin has repeatedly set for his generals.

However, there is still a long way to go. Since 2014, when the fighting in Donbas began, Russia has managed to occupy just over 60 percent of its territory. To achieve Putin's task, they need to capture an additional 4,000 square miles. That's a lot. If they maintain the record pace from October, they will capture all of Donbas in about two years unless the Americans limit or stop their aid after Donald Trump takes power.

In that case, the Russians will hold almost all the advantages. Even with much less well-trained soldiers, limited artillery ammunition stocks, and massive shortages in heavy equipment, they may overcome the Ukrainians through sheer numbers. Which they are currently doing. With limited domestic production and minimal ally support, the Ukrainians will run out of ammunition sooner than the Russians will run out of people.