Pentagon faces budget crisis over futuristic air dominance program

The NGAD program was intended to provide the American Air Force with a forward-looking, next-generation aircraft capable of replacing the currently used F-22 Raptor. However, ambitious plans have not withstood the test of reality, resulting in estimated costs for the new aircraft now reaching hundreds of millions of dollars. The Pentagon must look for savings.

The NGAD (Next Generation Air Dominance) program aimed to identify a successor to American air superiority fighters by 2030, introducing a next-generation, 6th-generation aircraft into service.

The US Air Force intended to symbolically retire older aircraft—though the process is planned to take many years—designed according to Cold War-era assumptions.

While the 5th-generation multi-role aircraft, the F-35, was supposed to replace the F-16 and A-10 (though its capabilities are controversial), the outcome of the NGAD program—a 6th-generation aircraft—was intended to replace older air superiority machines in the American Air Force, primarily the F-22 Raptor.

While the new, futuristic aircraft was the hallmark of the NGAD program, it was intended to be just one of its results. Ambitious assumptions predicted that development work would produce a futuristic "system of systems"—comprising a manned combat aircraft, unmanned machines known as loyal wingmen, new propulsion systems, aviation weaponry, and communications technology.

Top commanders of the American Air Force have repeatedly emphasized that a network of interconnected, cooperating solutions centered around a completely new aircraft will be crucial for winning future wars.

The NGAD program, thus conceived, was meant to elevate American aviation to a new level, maintaining or even increasing its superiority over all potential adversaries, notably China and Russia.

Recent news from across the ocean suggests that the Pentagon adopted overly ambitious assumptions regarding results and the program's timetable. If the plan were adhered to, a contract to build the prototype of the new aircraft would be signed in 2024. It appears, however, that this will not happen.

Current simulations indicate that the new aircraft—according to price estimates from 2030—may cost as much as $300-400 million (for comparison, the F-35, considered expensive, costs about $80 million). Assuming the United States will need 1,000-1,500 new machines, the program's cost becomes unaffordable even for the world's largest economic power.

Speculations circulating earlier on this topic were confirmed by work on the American Air Force budget for the 2026 fiscal year (note that fiscal years do not coincide with calendar years).

As the Pentagon modernizes two of the three elements of the nuclear triad (the B-21 Raider bomber and the Sentinel missile), the United States cannot afford another modernization program estimated at hundreds of billions of dollars. The research alone in the next five years was expected to consume over $28 billion.

In a statement to Aviation Week, Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall confirmed that budget decisions could impact the future of the NGAD program. To save it, the unit price of new aircraft must be reduced to a level close to the F-35—$100 million was indicated as the upper limit.

Lowering requirements is the way to achieve such a significant cost reduction. While America is not abandoning the new aircraft, which is considered necessary for a potential confrontation with China, cost-cutting measures include moving some research and development work out of the program or eliminating some aspects of it.

At the same time, interest is reviving in the 2019 concept of the Digital Century Series instead of one large development program. This concept references the so-called Century Series—a series of combat aircraft produced quickly and in large numbers in the 1950s, which included the F-100 Super Sabre, F-101 Voodoo, F-102 Delta Dagger, F-104 Starfighter, F-105 Thunderchief, F-106 Delta Dart.

According to this idea, the American industry should reverse the process rather than creating futuristic, mature technical solutions over many years and building a perfect aircraft. As a result, a relatively small series of the best aircraft the industry can provide would enter service every few years.

This approach would ensure that the Air Force constantly has the best possible equipment, and research and development work would be conducted not within large and expensive programs but through continuous improvement based on current industry and aviation capabilities.