Operation Mole Cricket 19. 82:0, or the Israeli "turkey hunt"

For years, the Israeli Air Force has been a power that has no worthy adversary in the Middle East. The operation Mole Cricket 19 can be considered the beginning of Israel's absolute domination in the air, during which Israeli pilots not only destroyed Syrian aviation without any losses, but also compromised Soviet anti-aircraft systems.

The Yom Kippur War, initiated in October 1973 by Egypt, Syria, and a coalition of Arab countries supporting them, was a struggle for survival for Israel. Repelling the attackers cost Israel thousands of fallen, about 1000 destroyed tanks, and over 100 aircraft, downed in both air combat and, to a large extent, by Arab anti-aircraft defense.

At that time, it was mainly composed of systems developed in the Soviet Union, such as the older S-75 Dvina, S-126 Neva, or the artillery ZSU-23-4 Shilka, but also very modern for its time, like the 2K12 Square (export version of the Kub system).

The anti-aircraft defense became a key issue for Israeli pilots, limiting the use of Israeli aviation, which dominates the Middle Eastern sky. Arab anti-aircraft gunners, led by Soviet officers, were responsible for approximately 85 percent of losses among planes with Stars of David on their wings.

Therefore, after the start on June 6, 1982, of Operation Peace for Galilee - the war with Syria for control over Lebanon - the neutralization of Syrian air defense and gaining air superiority, ensuring the free operation of Israeli aviation, became a key goal for the Jews.

The peak of these activities went down in history as the Battle over the Bekaa Valley. The assembly of significant anti-aircraft forces by Syria on Lebanese territory hampered the operation of Israel's aviation in this area.

On the other hand, it gave the Jews the opportunity to destroy the threat without attacking Syrian territory, which would risk escalating the conflict. Israel decided to take advantage of the opportunity.

The prelude to success was the earlier penetration of soldiers from Unit 5101 Shaldag (Kingfisher), specializing in cooperation with the air force, onto enemy territory. Israeli special forces then marked anti-aircraft defense positions, facilitating their destruction.

The radar stations P-15 also became a target - the main source of information for Syrians about the situation in the air over Lebanon.

Small OH-6 Cayuse helicopters were designated for these tasks, which penetrated the target area at low altitude and attacked the radars. Their positions, after the antennas were destroyed, were subsequently leveled to the ground by raids of A-4 Skyhawk attack aircraft.

The decisive phase of the operation began a day later - Israel sent reconnaissance drones over the Bekaa Valley, whose presence forced the Syrians to activate their radar of their anti-aircraft systems.

Information about the operating radars was collected, among others, by AWACS aircraft circling at a safe distance, E-2 Hawkeye planes. This allowed the identification of enemy positions and preparation for attack.

The F-4 Phantom aircraft, equipped with AGM-45 Shrike and AGM-78 Standard anti-radar missiles, were deployed. The attack - again - was preceded by drones, which by forcing the Syrians to turn on their radars, allowed the Phantoms to attack from a safe distance.

Anti-aircraft missile launchers were being destroyed one after the other in this way - in this way, 29 out of 30 Syrian systems fell victim to Israeli aircraft.

Parallel to the attacks on ground targets, an air battle was taking place, as the Syrians - seeing the destruction of their anti-aircraft defense - began sending additional planes to the conflict zone. These, acting impulsively and without coordination, fell prey to Israeli pilots, mainly from F-15 and - to a lesser extent - F-16 airplanes.

Israeli pilots had an easier task as the radars of Syrian machines, including modern MiG-25 or MiG-23 aircraft, were effectively disrupted by electronic warfare (EW) tools. The fate of the Syrian MiG-21 pilots was even worse, as their usage tactics assumed close cooperation with the ground control center. This - deprived of radar data - was silent.

Several dozen hours of fighting was enough for the Syrians to lose over 80 aircraft in this way (various sources report figures between 82 and 96). Israel, besides the drones deployed as bait, did not lose any.

Due to the fact that the battle was essentially an execution of the Syrian Air Force and air defense, the clashes over the Bekaa Valley came to be known as "turkey shoot". The name referred to the Battle of the Philippine Sea during World War II, which was nicknamed the "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot".

During one of the Japanese attacks, the Americans almost without losses shot down 97 enemy aircraft (and over the course of the entire, bloody battle for the Americans, over 300).

The Battle over the Bekaa Valley has gone down in history not only because of Israel's undisputed victory. It has also become an example - which air forces around the world still draw from - of the importance of electronic warfare, modern anti-radar missiles, and the use of drones.

In a broader perspective, the Battle of the Bekaa Valley is considered by some experts - like Tom Cooper or David Ivry, who commanded Operation Mole Cricket 19 - as one of the main causes of the end of the Cold War.

The one-sided course of the battles was meant to enlighten the Soviets that in the event of a possible clash with NATO, due to the technical superiority of the West, they were doomed to lose. According to supporters of this theory, it was supposed to accelerate the erosion and ultimate collapse of the Eastern Bloc.