Lukashenko resists pressure to join Russia's fight against Ukraine

In June this year, during a visit to Washington, the leader of the democratic forces in Minsk, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, warned that Lukashenko might once again allow Russia to use Belarusian territory to strike Ukraine or the Baltic states. However, she added that she could not imagine the "Belarusian army joining the Russian army because there are no anti-Ukrainian sentiments in her nation."

What Tsikhanouskaya says is very likely. The Belarusian dictator, Alexander Lukashenko, has been reluctant to engage in the war from the start. Although he provided Belarusian bases and training grounds and supplied Russia with more than 71,600 tons of ammunition, hundreds of T-72A tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and Ural trucks in the first year of the war, it wasn't for free. The Kremlin had to write off part of Belarus's debt and increase economic aid.

Lukashenko negotiated firmly each time. He knew that Putin was cornered and that without Minsk's help, he could lose face, so he took every possible advantage.

Currently, the Kremlin buys optical instruments, targeting systems, electronic equipment, fire control systems, specialized wheeled vehicles, and other items from Belarusian factories. The Russians have invested significant resources in developing the Belarusian industry and are now taking full advantage of the services offered by the local military-industrial complex.

According to Ukrainian intelligence, 120 Belarusian factories and design offices are currently producing 1,600 types of equipment and supplies for the Russian army. Meanwhile, 940 Russian enterprises supply about 4,000 goods to 67 Belarusian military enterprises.

For example, the 558th Aviation Repair Plant in Baranovichi has become a key repair center for Mi-8/Mi-17 helicopters after a series of Ukrainian attacks on plants in Rostov-on-Don. Machines damaged at the front are sent to the safe facilities in Baranovichi, where Ukrainian missiles cannot reach them.

At the beginning of last year, a joint Belarusian-Russian command was established, effectively another department within the Russian Western Military District. Belarusian units are directly subordinate to the Russians in terms of training and, partially, logistics. However, Minsk stipulated that the Russians cannot operationally command Belarusian units without Minsk's approval, meaning they cannot use them in military actions against Ukraine without consent.

The Russians are only responsible for an integrated training system to ensure that both armies are interoperable. This situation is reminiscent of the Soviet era, when the Unified Command of the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces was merely a façade of pluralism, formally being the 14th Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union.

Significantly, thanks to the joint command, the Russians can freely move their units onto Belarusian territory without informing Minsk. In return, equipment and money were used to accompany the soldiers to Belarus to modernize the neglected Belarusian army. This is the price for providing Belarusian training grounds where the Russians can train without fear of being attacked by Ukrainians.

The Russians currently do not maintain a permanent ground force contingent in Belarus but rotate units for which Belarus serves as a training base. The situation is different with the Air Force, which maintains significant forces, mainly fighter jets and reconnaissance aircraft, at the airports in Baranovichi and Minsk. Meanwhile, air strikes conducted from Belarusian territory have been reduced to zero.

Such participation in military activities is sufficient for Lukashenko. He is a pragmatist, and reducing debts to the Kremlin, developing his own military industry, and ensuring the continuity of power for the Lukashenko clan are more important to him.

It is almost certain that he will "run" for president in 2025. Sending the army to war for the Kremlin's interests could end in more extensive uprisings than those that occurred in August and September 2020. Additionally, he would not have the forces to suppress these protests if the military were on the front lines.

Furthermore, it would expose Belarus to retaliatory attacks from Ukraine, which could destroy the meticulously built arms industry that benefits both the state and the ruling clique.

It appears that participating in the attack on Ukraine simply does not pay off for Lukashenko, and he is aware of this. After all, he has resisted Putin's persuasions for almost three years. Lukashenko knows that Russian calls for Minsk's help are merely a cry in the wilderness and an expression of the Russian military's helplessness in the face of the Ukrainian attack on the Kursk region.