Fiber optic drones challenge defenses in Ukrainian conflict
The Russians have mastered the use of new drones, which pose a significant challenge for the Ukrainians. Jammers do not work on them, and the passive armor of vehicles such as the M2A2 Bradley from the United States and the Marder 1A3 from Germany is insufficient. Here, we explain the secret behind these drones.
In Ukraine, both sides employ FPV drones as a substitute for modern anti-tank guided missiles. These drones have a notable advantage because, due to their low speed and precision control, they allow the pilot to hit a specific spot on the armor very precisely. Below, you can see recordings of Russian FPV drone attacks using fiber optic cables on Ukrainian M2A2 Bradley and Marder 1A3.
Drones with fiber optics — the only defense against them is to shoot them down
FPV drones with attached items such as PG-7VL grenades have become a nightmare for Russian armored equipment, and they have gradually started using them themselves. Ukrainians could destroy even reinforced T-90M tanks with their help, while Russians could disable Leopard 2s.
Over time, however, both sides began using control signal jammers extensively, creating a specific bubble of interference around the vehicle, ranging from several dozen to hundreds of yards, to prevent attacks. As a result, periods of powerlessness for drone operators were followed by regained dominance if they could adjust the control frequency outside the jam range.
However, this was a workaround, and it created the necessity of designing drones that could operate under such conditions. Ultimately, there are two paths to the goal: one is using drones supported by artificial intelligence algorithms that allow autonomous flight for the last few hundred yards, and the other is using drones with deployable fiber optics.
The second method is simple and cost-effective because it has been used for decades in anti-tank-guided missiles. The deployable fiber optic cable ensures seamless transmission of the control and video signal in any condition until impact. An advantage for the Russians, for example, is the ability to hit a specific spot on a vehicle, bypassing sections of the M2A2 Bradley armored with BRAT reactive armor bricks.
Moreover, the drone is completely passive and emits no radio signals, making it undetectable to passive detectors. As a result, the only chance to stop such a drone is to detect it using radar or an electro-optical sensor and shoot it down. Currently, very few vehicles can independently defend themselves against them, a capability that is more likely to be in future tank and vehicle projects showcased at exhibitions like Eurosatory or MSPO.
At present, the greatest chance of defense is offered only by tanks and vehicles with active defense systems similar in concept to Israel's Rafael Trophy or equipped with an independent anti-drone module like the "beast from Tarnów".
Of course, "cable drones" have drawbacks. The need to carry a spool with deployable fiber optic cable limits their effective range to a few or just over six miles, depending on the components used and the drone's weight capacity. Both Ukrainians and Russians use fiber optic drones, and they are becoming increasingly popular due to their simplicity and ease of production.
