Could bombing Auschwitz have changed history? Experts divided

"We should have bombed it," said President George W. Bush while standing before an aerial photograph of the Auschwitz camp. Although his comment was directed at Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, it was publicized by Avner Shalev, then the head of Yad Vashem. Bill Clinton also indirectly addressed this issue during the opening of the Washington Holocaust Museum.

"If, instead of Jews, thousands of English, American or Russian women, children and aged had been tortured every day, burnt to death, asphyxiated in gas chambers-would you have acted in the same way?" asked David Ben-Gurion, chairman of the executive committee of the Jewish Agency, in the summer of 1944.

By that time, the purpose of the camp was well known. Reports on the extermination of Jews and the genocide carried out by the Germans at Auschwitz were reaching decision-makers desks, and Jewish organizations were calling for an aerial attack on the camp.

Auschwitz had been within reach of Allied aviation since 1943. This is supported not only by post-war speculation but also by eyewitness accounts. In the summer of 1944, Allied bombers appeared over Auschwitz.

The first planes arrived over the city on April 14, 1944, conducting reconnaissance and photographing important sites, such as the IG Farbenindustrie chemical plants (Werk Auschwitz O/S KL Auschwitz III) and the camp area. The raids followed, most likely conducted on four occasions: August 20 (B-17 planes), September 13 (B-24 planes), and two more on December 18 and 26.

None targeted Auschwitz, but two bombs did fall on camp structures, killing several prisoners.

After the war, surviving witnesses, Jewish activists, politicians, and historians began to ask: why wasn't the entire camp destroyed or at least the crematoria or rail infrastructure that brought thousands of new victims to Auschwitz?

British RAF Marshal Arthur Harris and the American War Department claimed it was not feasible due to distance and the lack of suitable planes, which were redirected to other deemed more important targets. This position was criticized by researchers like David S. Wyman and Martin Gilbert, who thoroughly analyzed the capabilities of Allied aviation.

Strategic bombers like the B-17 and B-24, which participated in raids on the Auschwitz IG Farben factory, had a range of about 1,800 to 2,500 miles with a bomb load. Potential issues with distance could have been mitigated, as demonstrated by a series of operations codenamed Frantic, where American bombers attacked targets in Europe but landed at Soviet airfields instead of returning to their home bases.

Obstacles with the Russians or their catastrophic neglect, which led to the destruction of numerous American planes by the Germans at the Poltava airfield, ended this cooperation.

Despite this, flights within subsequent Frantic operations, such as supply drops for the Warsaw Uprising, proved that almost all of Europe was within reach of Allied aviation. The relocation of German industrial plants did not move them beyond the reach of strategic bombers.

Could a raid on the Auschwitz camp have made a difference? Ewa Cuber-Strutyńska, a PhD candidate at the Institute of History of the Polish Academy of Sciences, addresses this in her work titled "The Issue of Bombing KL Auschwitz in Light of Selected Studies".

She refers to analyses suggesting at least three ways to destroy the camp's infrastructure without massacring the prisoners. Instead of using high-altitude strategic bombers, the option of using lighter B-25s was considered, though this would likely result in significant losses among the attacking machines.

Historian Richard G. Davis suggested alternative options, such as precise attacks on specific targets within the camp using aircraft like the P-38 Lightning or Mosquito. The P-38, with its twin-fuselage design, could carry a bomb load comparable to a large B-17, although the bomber's maximum bomb load was significantly greater.

The Mosquito, built with materials like plywood and fabric, was among the most versatile aircraft of World War II, fulfilling roles including as bombers. In 1944, they successfully completed missions that could be similar to a precise attack on Auschwitz.

The British used Mosquito aircraft to attack a prison in Amiens, occupied France. The objective was to facilitate the escape of French resistance members held there by the Germans. Aircraft targeted specific elements, such as select sections of walls or buildings. The raid, involving a dozen or so machines, was successful—although contested post-war—and enabled more than 180 detainees to escape.

This air raid, known as Operation Jericho, is often cited to support the thesis that a similar attack would have been possible at Auschwitz.

There are opposing views, however. Simply bombing the camp and allowing prisoners to escape wouldn't have ensured their survival, given the inevitable massive manhunt by the Germans. The genocidal machinery would not have been halted by destroying gas chambers or crematoria either. Albert Speer, a leader of Nazi Germany, mentioned in an interview that the Germans would have turned to methods used for genocide in the USSR territories, such as shootings and mobile gas chambers, on a larger scale.

The belief that the slaughter could be halted by destroying railway tracks is also debatable. Several rail routes led to Auschwitz, and even extensive damage would have been repaired quickly by specialized units, sometimes within mere hours.

Thus, the question of whether bombing Auschwitz would have made a difference will likely forever divide historians. Politicians' declarations on this issue—despite being publicized—remain personal opinions influenced by the profound impact of the German genocide.

We will never know if bombing Auschwitz or its railway tracks could have altered the course of the Holocaust. What we do know is that the Allies' efforts, culminating in the final victory over the Third Reich, ultimately ended it.